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SPEAK NO EVIL, SEEN NO EVIL, DO NO
EVIL:
CLIENT SELECTION AND
COOPERATION WITH EVIL*
Teresa Stanton Collett**
INTRODUCTION
MAY a Roman Catholic lawyer agree to represent the local
I Planned Parenthood affiliate in its challenge to state statutes re-
stricting abortion?' May a Jewish lawyer defend a corporation's gen-
eral policy which forbids employees to wear any head covering?2 May
an evangelical Protestant lawyer agree to sue a landlord for illegal
discrimination when the landlord refuses to rent to an unmarried
couple because the landlord believes that unmarried cohabitation is
immoral?3 Are the lawyer's religious beliefs relevant in deciding
whether to accept these cases? If so, how? Is their relevance the
same or different from the relevance of other serious moral commit-
ments held by believers and non-believers alike?
This article attempts to answer these questions in the context of the
client-selection process by religious believers engaged in the private
practice of law.4 I maintain that religious beliefs can rightly be deter-
minative in the religious lawyer's selection of clients. No religious be-
liever should accept cases requiring the lawyer to advocate evil acts,
* All citations to the Bible refer to the New American Bible.
** Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law of Texas A&M University,
Houston, Texas; Visiting Scholar, Notre Dame Law School. I am grateful for the
guidance, comments, and criticisms that I received on drafts of this paper from Cathe-
fine Burnett, my husband Bob Collett, Monroe Freedman, Germain Grisez, Doug
Kmeic, Randy Lee, Kevin Miller, Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Val Ricks, Robert Rodes,
Bob Tuttle, and David Wilkins.
1. Cf. Schneider v. Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico, 917 F.2d 620, 636-38
(1st Cir. 1990) (authorizing increased legal fees based on statements that local attor-
neys were reluctant to accept representation of individuals seeking to challenge re-
strictions on abortion).
2. Cf Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 509-10 (1986) (holding that a mili-
tary dress requirement prohibiting the wearing of a yarmulke was constitutional).
3. Compare Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 278
(Alaska 1994) (holding that the refusal of a Christian landlord to rent to an unmarried
couple violated a state law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of marital status),
with State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 8-10 (Minn. 1990) (holding that the refusal of a
Christian landlord to rent to an unmarried couple did not violate a state law prohibit-
ing discrimination on the basis of marital status and that application of an anti-dis-
crimination statute would violate a landlord's free exercise of religion).
4. This article is limited to the decisions of individual lawyers. The moral claim
of other lawyers with whom the lawyer is associated will be dealt with in a separate
article.
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or the total disregard of religious obligations, or the irrelevance of
religious beliefs.'
This article is written from the Christian perspective, more specifi-
cally, Roman Catholic. 6 Part I describes what has been denominated
as the standard conception of lawyering. This conception is groupided
in the political philosophy of the Enlightenment, which celebrates au-
tonomy, rationality, and neutrality by the state. Part II explains how
the Christian understanding of autonomy and rationality differs from
that offered by contemporary apologists for the standard conception
and challenges the legitimacy of claims of neutrality by the state. Part
III contrasts the Christian duty to avoid cooperation with evil with the
standard conception's defense of the amorality of lawyering, a direct
corollary to the purported neutrality of the state. The principle of
double effect and the obligation to avoid giving scandal are explained
as limitations upon the Christian lawyer's ability to accept clients.
Part III then provides specific examples of the application of these
principles to the client-selection process.
I. THE SECULARIST "STANDARD CONCEPTION" OF THE LAWYER'S
ROLE
Under contemporary professional rules, acceptance of representa-
tion means the lawyer enters into a relationship with the client for the
express purpose of achieving the client's objectives.7 Clients may be
assisted in obtaining any lawful objective, but assisting a client in
5. Perhaps the same can be said of adamant atheists, yet the variety of philosoph-
ical systems that purport to give meaning to "good" and "evil" and the pragmatic
reasons for respect of others' religious beliefs are sufficiently different from the ra-
tionale of the believing lawyer, that I am not confident there is sufficient common
ground from which to persuade atheists to observe these duties.
6. 1 am a practicing member of the Roman Catholic Church, which I joined as an
adult. Throughout my childhood, adolescence, and most of my early adulthood, I was
an active member of the United Methodist Church. Originally I had hoped to encom-
pass many religious traditions in my analysis of these issues, but the more I explored
the issues, the more I discovered mastery and application of relevant Roman Catholic
doctrines presented sufficient challenge. It remains my sincere hope, however, that
the questions raised in this article will be addressed by authors writing from other
religious perspectives.
7. Model Rule 1.2(a) provides in pertinent part:
A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of rep-
resentation, subject to paragraphs (c) [limitations consented to by the client],
(d) [prohibition of assisting in criminal or fraudulent conduct], and (e) [duty
to consult with client when client seeks prohibited objectives], and shall con-
sult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2(a) (1989) [hereinafter Model Rules].
Comments to the rule recognize that many objectives of representation are the prod-
uct of cooperative decisionmaking between client and lawyer: "Both lawyer and cli-
ent have authority and responsibility in the objectives and means of representation.
The client has ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be served by legal
representation, within the limits imposed by law and the lawyer's professional obliga-
tions." Id.
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achieving a criminal or fraudulent objective is forbidden.' Attorneys
must reject proposed representation if a prohibited objective is
known at the outset.9
According to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, representa-
tion pf a client "does not constitute an endorsement of the client's
political, economic, social or moral views or activities."' 0 This lan-
guage, first adopted with the passage of the Model Rules in 1983, is
often cited as supporting the proposition that lawyers are not morally
accountable for the actions of their clients." This contemporary un-
derstanding of lawyering has been justified by reference to ideals of
client autonomy or the equality of citizens.
Autonomy is considered the primary characteristic of the client in
the standard conception of lawyering. This is because the person evi-
dences his or her unique identity as a moral actor through choosing
and ascribing value."2 The standard conception of lawyering is
grounded in a jurisprudence that understands the essence of law as
coercion. 3 Law primarily is understood as setting limits on the ability
of the person to choose freely among all possible options.' 4 Accord-
8. Model Rules, supra note 7, Model Rule 1.2(d):
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct
that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the
legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may
counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the valid-
ity, scope, meaning or application of the law.
9. Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 1.16(a). Attorneys also must withdraw from
ongoing representation when the client persists in seeking an illegal or fraudulent
objective. Id.
10. Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 1.2(b).
11. One of the best descriptions of the "standard conception" of the lawyer's role
is provided by Murray L. Schwartz in The Professionalism and Accountability of Law-
yers, 66 Cal. L. Rev. 669, 673 (1978). Devotion to partisanship and nonaccountability,
the two ideals identified by Professor Schwartz, was dubbed the "standard concep-
tion" by Gerald J. Postema in Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 63,73 (1980). Somescholars have argued that there is no standard conception
of a lawyer's role or that the standard conception does not guide lawyers' decision-
making in the day-to-day practice of law. See Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's Stan-
dard Misconception of Legal Ethics, 1984 Wis. L Rev. 1529, 1532-37.
12. Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-
Client Relation, 85 Yale LJ. 1060, 1068-69 (1976) ("We must attain and maintain in
our morality a concept of personality such that it makes sense to posit choosing, valu-
ing entities-free, moral beings.").
13. This understanding of the coercive nature of law is fully described and de-
fended in Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (1946).
14. Monroe H. Freedman, Understanding Lawyers' Ethics 47-50 (1990) [hereinaf-
ter Freedman, Ethics] (disagreeing with Fried's friendship model set forth in Lawyer
as Friend but agreeing with Fried's essential point that "human autonomy is a funda-
mental moral concept that must determine, in substantial part, the answers that we
give to some of the most difficult issues regarding the lawyer's role"). In the civil
context, Freedman suggests that all legal counseling is done in anticipation of future
litigation: "[Alny lawyer who counsels a client, negotiates on a client's behalf, or
drafts a legal document for a client must do so with an actual or potential adversary in
mind." Id- at 66.
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ing to the standard conception, people seeking to resist the coercion
inherent in the law are morally entitled to the assistance of a person
skilled in the language and procedures of the legal system. Therefore,
the lawyer acts morally in protecting the client's freedom from the
coercive demands of the law, regardless of how the client ultimately
uses that freedom.' 5
This explanation of the lawyer's role, however, fails to address the
constitutive aspect of contemporary law. Law creates, as well as lim-
its, individual choice. The law governing testamentary disposition of
property exemplifies the choice-enhancing aspect of the law. No per-
son could exercise any authority over the disposition of his property
after death but for the Statute of Wills, or its modern successor. The
role of the lawyer in such cases is not to resist the coercive aspect of
the law, but to advise and guide the client in the use of this newly
created freedom.
This second role of the lawyer gives rise to an alternative argument
for the lawyer's nonaccountability. This argument characterizes amor-
ality as a necessary condition to insure all citizens equal access to the
benefits of the law.' 6 Professor Stephen Pepper has suggested that
holding lawyers morally accountable for their assistance in the actions
of their clients would cause lawyers to act as moral filters when clients
attempt to learn or use the law. This would result in some clients hav-
ing access to all of the law's benefits, while others would receive only
partial benefits or protection in accordance with the scruples of the
lawyer. This stratification of the benefits of citizenship is contrary to
the equality of persons. Therefore, Pepper argues, moral nonac-
countability of lawyers is necessary to assure full and equal access to
the law. 1
7
15. Freedman states his position as follows:
Accordingly, the attorney acts both professionally and morally in assisting
clients to maximize their autonomy, that is, by counseling clients candidly
and fully regarding the clients' legal rights and moral responsibilities as the
lawyer perceives them, and by assisting clients to carry out their lawful deci-
sions. Further, the attorney acts unprofessionally and immorally by depriv-
ing clients of their autonomy, that is, by denying them information regarding
their legal rights, by otherwise preempting their moral decisions, or by de-
priving them of the ability to carry out their lawful decisions.
Freedman, Ethics, supra note 14, at 57. It is important to note that Professor Freed-
man believes that lawyers make a moral decision in choosing to represent a client or
cause and that they have a duty of public justification for their choice. Monroe H.
Freedman, The Lawyer's Moral Obligation of Justification, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 111, 111-12
(1995) [hereinafter Freedman, The Lawyer's Moral Obligation].
16. Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Prob-
lem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 613, 615-19.
17. Id.; cf. Schneyer, supra note 11, at 1541 ("Without a professional ethic based
on Neutrality and Partisanship [i.e., the standard conception], moralistic lawyers
could conceivably nullify legal rights by refusing to accept certain clients or to take
certain perfectly legal steps for others.").
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Both the autonomy and equality-based arguments for amoral lawy-
ering are grounded in a secularist understanding of the person and his
or her relationship to the community and the state. This secularist
understanding manifests one form of political liberalism. 8 Clients are
viewed as "free and independent selves unclaimed by moral ties ante-
cedent to choice."' 9 Acts which have value are those acts which are
chosen by the client, and value accrues to those acts by virtue of being
chosen, rather than any inherent moral quality to the act. 20 A concep-
tion of lawyering built upon this understanding of the person neces-
sarily venerates the lawyer's role in facilitating the client's choice,
rather than the object or purpose of that choice.
This is consistent with political liberalism's commitment to neutral-
ity among competing conceptions of the good life.21 If no particular
conception of the good life is to be favored by the state, then the indi-
vidual ultimately reigns supreme in defining the goals and purposes of
his or her life. This sovereignty is due in large part to the confidence
of Enlightenment philosophers that reason would guide the individual
to choices simultaneously benefiting both the individual and the larger
community. "Enlightened self-interest" ultimately would promote the
common good, without use of the coercive power of the state. In
cases where the nature of the common good was contested and had to
be defined in order to pursue a particular path of common effort, pub-
lic dialogue and the rational process of argument and disputation
would lead to a recognizable "solution."'  Thus autonomy, neutrality,
and rationality are the foundational premises upon which the standard
conception of the lawyer's role is built.
II. TRUE (AND FALSE) MEANINGS OF AUTONOMY, NEUTRALITY,
AND RATIONALITY
For the Roman Catholic Christian, the "standard conception" of
lawyering and its underlying version of political liberalism are built
18. A full discussion of the variants of political liberalism is outside the scope of
this article. John Richard Neuhaus, The Liberalism of John Patti 1 in First Things 16
(1997) provides a brief, but accessible, treatment of this topic. The limitations of this
understanding of human nature in crafting effective rules of law are explored by Mary
Ann Glendon in Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse (1991).
19. Michael J. Sandel, Freedom of Conscience or Freedom of Choice?, in Articles
of Faith, Articles of Peace 74, 76 (James Davison Hunter & Os Guinness eds., 1990);
see also Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 Tex. L Rev.
963 (1987) (assessing the ethics of radical individualism in terms of the religious tradi-
tion's influence on legal ethics).
20. The plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992),
relies on this understanding of the human person: "At the heart of liberty is the right
to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State." Id. at 851.
21. Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Comnitmity, 77 Cal. L Rev. 479, 502-04 (1989).
22. Id. at 499-502.
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upon distortions of autonomy, neutrality, and rationality. Autonomy
is valuable, but its value does not lie in the "freedom to make any
choice."2 It lies in the freedom to make good choices; to fully appro-
priate into one's being the value of goodness and to participate in the
creation of future possibilities of goodness. "The more one does what
is good, the freer one becomes. There is no true freedom except in
the service of what is good and just. The choice to disobey and do evil
is an abuse of freedom and leads to 'the slavery of sin."' 24 To the
Christian, the ultimate value of autonomy is that it allows the human
person to know and love God, rather than merely fear and obey
Him.25 Since the intended destiny of each individual is recognition as
a child of God, autonomy, defined as the freedom to do good, must be
preserved in anticipation that this freedom ultimately will result in a
loving response to God's call.2 6
The "neutrality" that supports the standard conception of lawyering
is equally foreign to the Christian understanding of the world. The
believing lawyer cannot assent to the sort of agnostic skepticism or
moral relativism that masquerades as neutrality among competing vi-
sions of the good in the current conception of political liberalism. 7
Christians know that good and evil exist. These realities are not some
human construct, existing only because of our belief.28 Good and evil
23. "Only in freedom can man direct himself toward goodness. Our contemporar-
ies make much of this freedom and pursue it eagerly; and rightly to be sure. Often
however they foster it perversely as a license for doing whatever pleases them, even if
it is evil." Second Vatican Council, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Mod-
em World (Gaudium et Spes) para. 17 (1965).
24. Catechism of the Catholic Church, § 1733 (1994); see also Galatians 5:13 ("My
brothers, remember that you have been called to live in freedom-but not a freedom
that gives free reign to the flesh. Out of love, place yourselves at one another's
service.").
25. All who are led by the Spirit of God are sons of God. You did not receive
a spirit of slavery leading you back into fear, but a spirit of adoption through
which we cry out, "Abba!" [that is, "Father"]. The Spirit himself gives wit-
ness with our spirit that we are children of God. But if we are children, we
are heirs as well: heirs of God, heirs with Christ, if only we suffer with him
so as to be glorified with him.
Romans 8:14-17; see also Galatians 4:1-7 (stating that followers of God's law are His
sons and heirs); John 1:12-13 (same).
26. "For its part, authentic freedom is an exceptional sign of the divine image
within man. For God has willed that man remain 'under the control of his own deci-
sions,' so that he can seek his Creator spontaneously, and come freely to utter and
blissful perfection through loyalty to Him." Second Vatican Council, supra note 23,
para. 17.
27. Cf. Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 Stan. L. Rev.
589, 620-23 (1985) (providing a more generalized critique of agnosticism by the bar).
28. Compare the radical subjectivity exemplified by the writings of Richard Rorty:
"Insofar as pragmatists make a distinction between knowledge and opinion, it is sim-
ply the distinction between topics on which such agreement is relatively easy to get
and topics on which agreement is relatively hard to get." Richard Rorty, Objectivity,
Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers 23 (1991).
Pope John Paul II rejects the view that knowledge of good and evil are mere human
constructs. Writing about the dangers of such radical skepticism, he states:
1344 [Vol. 66
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reflect our embrace or rejection of God and the fullness of life.' In
coming to know God through Jesus Christ, the Holy Spirit, the Scrip-
tures, and the traditions of the faith, the Christian comes to know
good from evil.3°
This knowledge, combined with a right understanding of autonomy,
does not answer the question of the state's role in encouraging people
to seek the good. It is often assumed that belief in man's capacity to
know good from evil necessarily results in a belief that the state must
require goodness of its citizens, but this is not so.
It is widely held that the inner logic of such an affirmation [of a
substantive concept of the human good derived from our under-
standing of God and his plan for humanity] tends inexorably toward
policy authoritarianism, and thus that such an affirmation necessar-
ily constitutes some kind of incipient fascism.... Yet, although
widely asserted, the truth of this claim is by no means self-evident.
From the premise that we can know the human good it does not
automatically follow that it is the right-much less the duty-of
government to compel all to embrace it. If some substantive con-
ceptions of the good life may foster an authoritarian politics, others
may foster a commitment to government that is sharply limited in
its scope and responsible to those it governs.3 1
The Christian conception of the lawyer's commitment to freedom
from governmental coercion grows from an awareness of the proper
limits of government, and the role lawyers play in maintaining those
limits. This stands in stark contrast to both the autonomy and equality
The individual conscience is accorded the status of a supreme tribunal of
moral judgment which hands down categorical and infallible decisions about
good and evil. To the affirmation that one has a duty to follow one's con-
science is unduly added the affirmation that one's moral judgment is true
merely by the fact that it has its origin in the conscience. But in this way the
inescapable claims of truth disappear, yielding their place to a criterion of
sincerity, authenticity and "being at peace with oneself," so much so that
some have come to adopt a radically subjectivistic conception of moral
judgment.
Pope John Paul II, The Splendor of Truth (Veritatis Splendor), para. 32 (1993) [herein-
after Pope John Paul II, The Splendor of Truth].
29. Jesus makes this clear in his response to the rich young man who seeks his
counsel: "Why do you call me good? No one is good, but God alone." Matthew 19:19;
cf. Germain Grisez & Russel Shaw, Fulfillment in Christ: A Summary of Christian
Moral Principles 49-51 (1991) (defining good and bad as follows: "The Christian tra-
dition has developed a better account of the bad. Badness is real, not illusory. It is a
real absence in things of what ought to be .... To be good is for something to be fully,
to be all it should be-no lacks, no privations."); id. at 80 (defining the morally good:
"In voluntarily acting for human goods and avoiding what is opposed to them, one
ought to choose and otherwise will those and only those possibilities whose willing is
compatible with a will toward integral human fulfillment.").
30. "Revelation teaches that 'the power to decide what is good and what is evil
does not belong to man, but to God alone."' Pope John Paul 11, The Splendor of
Truth, supra note 28, para. 35.
31. Kenneth L. Grasso, Beyond Liberalism, in Catholicism, Liberalism, & Com-
munitarianism 53-54 (Kenneth L. Grasso et al. eds., 1995).
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versions of the standard conception of lawyering, which affirm as a
moral right the individual's right to do evil when not forbidden in the
positive law.32
Finally, the rationality that is foundational to the political liberalism
supporting the standard conception of lawyering is incomplete. Ra-
tionality limited only to the material world denies the human ability to
perceive, describe, and participate in (no matter how imperfectly or
partially) a reality that transcends the physical world.3 The Christian
rejects this stunted form of rationality.34 In its place is offered a defi-
nition of rationality grounded in the human experience of the natural
order which has its origin, presence, and destination in the
transcendent.35
32. Jeremy Waldron, A Right to Do Wrong, 92 Ethics 21, 21-39 (1981).
33. Pope John Paul II describes this outlook in The Splendor of Truth:
Today too, the situation of the world of the senses within space and time,
physio-chemical constants, bodily processes, psychological impulses and
forms of social conditioning seem to many people the only really decisive
factors of human reality. In this context even moral facts, despite their spec-
ificity, are frequently treated as if they were statistically verifiable data, pat-
terns of behavior which can be subject to observation or explained
exclusively in categories of psychosocial processes. As a result, some
ethicists, professionally engaged in the study of human realities and behav-
ior, can be tempted to take as the standard for their discipline and even for
its operative norms the results of a statistical study of concrete human be-
havior patterns and the opinions about morality encountered in the majority
of people.
Pope John Paul II, The Splendor of Truth, supra note 28, para. 46.
34. Pope John Paul II, Crossing the Threshold of Hope 51-59 (1994) ("With such a
way of thinking [the existence of God is irrelevant to human reasoning about human
experience], the rationalism of the Enlightenment strikes at the heart of Christian
soteriology, that is, theological reflection on salvation [soteria in Greek] and of
redemption.").
35. Second Vatican Council, supra note 23, para. 36:
For by the very circumstance of their having been created, all things are
endowed with their own stability, truth, goodness, proper laws and order.
Man must respect these as he isolates them by the appropriate methods of
the individual sciences or arts. Therefore if methodical investigation within
every branch of learning is carried out in a genuinely scientific manner and
in accord with moral norms, it never truly conflicts with faith, for earthly
matters and the concerns of faith derive from the same God. Indeed who-
ever labors to penetrate the secrets of reality with a humble and steady
mind, even though he is unaware of the fact, is nevertheless being led by the
hand of God, who holds all things in existence, and gives them their identity.
Consequently, we cannot but deplore certain habits of mind, which are
sometimes found too among Christians which do not sufficiently attend to
the rightful independence of science and which, from the arguments and
controversies they spark, lead many minds to conclude that faith and science
are mutually opposed.
But if the expression, the independence of temporal affairs, is taken to
mean that created things do not depend on God, and that man can use them
without any reference to their Creator, anyone who acknowledges God will
see how false such a meaning is. For without the Creator the creature would
disappear. For their part, however, all believers of whatever religion always
[Vol. 661346
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The standard conception and the Christian conception of lawyering
share commitments to autonomy and rationality. Both hold that
human freedom is necessary to the good life, and both acknowledge
the role of human reason in the identification of what constitutes the
good life. Only on the value of neutrality do the standard and Chris-
tian conceptions of lawyering necessarily conflict. This conflict may
exist because the standard conception of lawyering is premised upon
the law as a formative cause of the relationships between citizens
while the Christian conception of lawyering asserts that the primary
formative cause of relationships between people is their relationship
with and through God.
A. Primary Relationships with and Through God
For the Christian, the primary relationship in every person's life is
the relationship between God and the person. Through this relation-
ship we come to recognize all people as our neighbors, having some
moral claim upon us, independent of the positive law or the require-
ments of citizenship. a6 This ordering of relationships, and the nature
of the claims arising from them, are described in Scripture:
When the Pharisees heard that he had silenced the Sadducees, they
assembled in a body, and one of them [a scholar of the law] tested
him by asking, "Teacher, which commandment in the law is the
greatest?" Jesus said to him, "You shall love the Lord, your God,
with your whole heart, with your whole soul, and with all your mind.
This is the first and greatest commandment. The second is like it:
hear His revealing voice in the discourse of creatures. When God is forgot-
ten, however, the creature itself grows unintelligible.
Id.; cf. Abraham J. Heschel, Who is Man? 71-72 (1965):
The question [of the meaning of the universe] refers to transcendence of
being; it affirms what is beyond, over, and above being. In asking it, we
leave the level of logical and strictly verifiable thinking and climb to the level
of mystery. Such a step is one which logically we must not take; it transcends
the boundaries of legitimate logic. Yet in spite of all warnings insisting and
proving that the question is meaningless, man will never cease to raise it.
The question affirms its own validity. Science cannot silence him, the power
of logic cannot permanently suppress it. Indeed, in giving up the anxiety for
meaning, man would cease to be human; logical positivism's gain would be
humanity's loss.
Id
36. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, The Cost of Discipleship (1949). Bonhoeffer contends
that:
We are separated from one another by an unbridgeable gulf of otherness and
strangeness which resists all our attempts to overcome it by means of natural
association or emotional or spiritual union. There is no way from one per-
son to another. However loving and sympathetic we try to be, however
sound our psychology, however frank and open our behaviour, we cannot
penetrate the incognito of the other man, for there are no direct relation-
ships, not even between soul and soul. Christ stands between us, and we
only get into touch with our neighbours through him.
Id. at 98.
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You shall love your neighbor as yourself. On these two command-
ments the whole law is based, and the prophets as well."
37
The first and primary relationship between God and the person de-
fines both the object and the circumstances of the believer's life.38
In living the relationship of believer and God, all actions are good
insofar as they are directed toward or consistent with the person's lov-
ing relationship with God.39 Whether an action is "directed toward or
consistent with" a loving relationship with God is determined by the
actor's intention, his or her circumstances, and the object of the act.4"
Intention is the voluntary ordering of the human will, or the purpose
of the actor. Circumstances are conditions surrounding and exper-
ienced by the acting person at the time of deliberation and action. The
actor's circumstances include the foreseeable consequences of the act,
defined as the anticipated changes in the state of affairs, both internal
and external to the acting person, resulting from the act. The object of
an act is the "proximate end of a deliberate decision which determines
the act of willing on the part of the acting person. ' 41 Since the inten-
tion and object of the actor are within his or her control, these ele-
ments largely define the morality of any particular act. Circumstances
can lessen or increase personal culpability for evil acts, or personal
merit for good acts, but circumstances alone cannot alter the intrinsic
morality of any voluntary deed. 2 Similarly, foreseeable consequences
are morally relevant when choosing between competing goods, or de-
termining whether to engage in a morally neutral act,43 but they can-
not convert an intrinsically evil act to a morally permissible one. All
37. Matthew 22:34-40; see also Mark 12:28-34:
One of the scribes, came up, and when he heard them arguing, he realized
how skillfully Jesus answered them. He decided to ask him, "Which is the
first of all the commandments?" Jesus replied, "This is the first: 'Hear, 0
Israel! The Lord our God is Lord alone! Therefore, you shall love the Lord
your God with all your heart, with all your soul, with all your mind, and with
all your strength.' This is the second: 'You shall love your neighbor as your-
self.' There is no other commandment greater than these."
38. "In fact, the individual's relation to God is the constitutive element of the very
'being' and 'existence' of an individual: it is in God that we 'live, move and have our
being' (quoting Acts 17:28)." John Paul II, The Lay Members of Christ's Faithful Peo-
ple, para. 39 (1988).
39. "Acting is morally good when the choices of freedom are in conformity with
man's true good and thus express the voluntary ordering of the person towards his
ultimate end: God himself, the supreme good in whom man finds his full and perfect
happiness." John Paul II, The Splendor of Truth, supra note 28, para. 72.
40. "The rational ordering of the human act to the good in its truth and the volun-
tary pursuit of that good, known by reason, constitute morality." Id.; see also Thomas
J. Bole, III, The Theoretical Tenability of the Doctrine of Double Effect, 16 J. Med. &
Phil. 467, 467-68 (1991) (explaining the doctrine of double effect which may result in
good and bad side effects despite good moral intentions).
41. Pope John Paul II, The Splendor of Truth, supra note 28, para. 78.
42. "If acts are intrinsically evil, a good intention or particular circumstances can
diminish their evil, but they cannot remove it." Id. para. 81.
43. Id. para. 77.
[Vol. 661348
CLIENT SELECTION AND COOPERATION
circumstances, including consequences, of a particular act cannot be
identified with certainty, either before or after acting; thus this ele-
ment cannot form the primary basis for moral judgment."
The primary determinates of whether an act is morally good or evil
are the actor's intentions and the object of the act. Good intentions
are necessary for the individual to enjoy the formative benefits from a
right ordering of the will, but good intentions will not convert an in-
trinsically evil object into a morally neutral or good act. The classic
example of this principle is that of judicial murder, where a judge
knowingly orders the execution of an innocent person in order to save
the lives of others who would die in the rioting that would ensue if the
accused were released.45 The intention of the judge is good-to save
several lives-but the object of his will (the proximate end of his deci-
sion) is to kill an innocent man. The evil inherent in this object is not
extinguished nor outweighed by the judge's right intent.
Similarly, an evil intention precludes an act from being morally
good because the evil intention diminishes the actor's relationship
with God and the ability to discern good from evil. The daughter who
cares for her elderly parents only for the purpose of obtaining access
to their bank accounts to siphon off funds for her own use does not
engage in a morally good act, even though the object of her act, caring
for elderly parents, is good. From this it can be concluded that the
actor's intention and object are the primary elements to be evaluated
when determining the moral quality of an act.
Application of these principles to the practice of law requires law-
yers to evaluate their intentions and objects prior to accepting any
proposed representation. There is rarely any moral impediment to ac-
cepting cases where the prospective client, with good intentions, seeks
a good object such as the widow seeking distribution of her portion of
the family property, the housing developer expanding his business to
provide more affordable housing, the doctor seeking to defend her
practices against false claims of neglect or incompetence. All of these
intentions and objects are consistent with a loving response to God.
Representation of these clients poses no problem in the believing law-
yer embracing the intentions and objects of the client's proposed
action.46
The difficult questions for Christian lawyers arise when they are
asked to assist a client in achieving an evil object, satisfy an evil inten-
tion through attaining a proper object, or attain a proper object, the
evil consequences of which outweigh the good achieved by the act.
44. l
45. Various philosophical responses to this example are described in Albert R.
DiIanni, S.M., The Direct/Indirect Distinction in Morals, 41 The Thomist 350 (1977).
46. While the lawyer may embrace the good intention and object of the prospec-
tive client, other prudential considerations may require that the lawyer decline repre-
sentation. See infra notes 57-114 & accompanying text.
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Christian lawyers can seek no sanctuary in the moral relativist's justifi-
cation of such representation--that good and evil are entirely depen-
dent upon the particular features of each situation. Christians know
better. Actions that destroy or diminish the person's relationship with
God and neighbor are evil, always and everywhere. a7 Through divine
revelation in the Word of God, certain actions are known to be intrin-
sically destructive of the relationship with God or neighbor.4" These
actions are forbidden by the negative precepts contained in the Ten
Commandments: You shall have no other gods besides me; 9 You
shall not kill;50 You shall not commit adultery;5' You shall not steal;52
You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor;53 You shall not
covet anything that belongs to your neighbor.5 Christian lawyers may
never make these prohibited acts the objects of their will,55 even as
means to good objects.56
47. The Catechism of the Catholic Church states:
Sin is an offense against God: "Against you, you alone, have I sinned, and
done that which is evil in your sight." Sin sets itself against God's love for us
and turns our hearts away from it. Like the first sin, it is disobedience, a
revolt against God through the will to become "like gods," knowing and
determining good and evil. Sin is thus "love of oneself even to contempt of
God." In this proud self-exaltation, sin is diametrically opposed to the obe-
dience of Jesus, which achieves our salvation.
Catechism of the Catholic Church, § 1850 (1994), (quoting Psalms 51:4; Genesis 3:5;
St. Augustine, The City of God 14, 28; and citing Philippians 2:6-9).
48. See id. § 1849 (quoting St. Augustine, Contra Faustum 22:PL 41,436):
Sin is an offense against reason, truth, and right conscience; it is failure in
genuine love for God and neighbor caused by a perverse attachment to cer-
tain goods. It wounds the nature of man and injures human solidarity. It has
been defined as "an utterance, a deed, or a desire contrary to the eternal
law."
49. Exodus 20:3.
50. Id. at 20:13.
51. Id. at 20:14.
52. Id. at 20:15.
53. Id. at 20:16.
54. Id. at 20:17.
55. Reflecting on the Ten Commandments, Pope John Paul II writes:
The "negative precepts" of the natural law are universally valid. They oblige
each and every individual, always and in every circumstance. It is a matter
of prohibitions which forbid a given action "semper et pro semper," without
exception, because the choice of this kind of behavior is in no case compati-
ble with the goodness of the will of the acting person, with his vocation to
life with God and to communion with his neighbor. It is prohibited-to eve-
ryone and in every case-to violate these precepts. They oblige everyone,
regardless of the cost, never to offend in anyone, beginning with oneself, the
personal dignity common to all.
Pope John Paul II, The Splendor of Truth, supra note 28, para. 52.
56. "In truth if it is sometimes permissible to tolerate a lesser moral evil in order
to avoid a greater evil or to promote a greater good, it is not permissible, not even for
the gravest reasons, to do evil that good may follow therefrom." Pope Paul VI, On
Human Life (Humanae Vitae) (1968), para. 14; cf. Romans 3:8 ("Or why may we not
do evil that good may come of it?"). In other words, it is forbidden to intend directly
something which of its very nature contradicts the moral order, and which must there-
fore be judged unworthy of man, even though the intention is to protect or promote
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But does a lawyer who agrees to represent someone having a mor-
ally unacceptable objective or end in view necessarily share the cli-
ent's evil intention? No. Christians understand that this is a fallen
world, where good and evil often flow from a single act. Christian
lawyers need a way to distinguish the occasions when representation
necessarily means embracing the evil intentions and objects of the cli-
ents, from times when the lawyer's intentions and objects in the repre-
sentation may properly be characterized as separate and distinct from
those of the client. Such a theory must be grounded in recognition
that every voluntary act has a moral quality. It must account for the
intentions and objects of both the client and the lawyer, and it must
encompass the concrete circumstances surrounding the decisions of
the client and lawyer. The secularist standard conception of the law-
yer's role fails to assist lawyers in making these judgments.
III. LAWYER AUTONOMY AND SINFUL COOPERATION IN THE EVIL
OF OTHERS
The neutrality of lawyers promoted by the standard conception of
the lawyer's role rests upon the bedrock of political liberalism's com-
mitment to neutrality among competing visions of the individual and
common good. Supporters for the idea of lawyer neutrality claim that
lawyers are not morally accountable for the causes or clients they
choose to represent because the morality of the role outweighs the
immoral activities the role sometimes facilitates s7 This view finds
the welfare of an individual, of a family or of society in general. Contrast this with the
proportionalist approach advocated by Professor Rhode in Deborah L Rhode, Ethi-
cal Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 589, 645 (1985):
To argue for individual assumption of responsibility, however, only begins
analysis. The more difficult issue, which remains a highly contextual deter-
mination, is what that responsibility entails. Relevant factors include not
only the magnitude and likelihood of potential harm and the attorney's ca-
pacity to affect it, but also the personal and social costs that corrective action
would impose. Among those costs, the possible loss of client or collegial
trust is entitled to weight. In some instances, an individual's dependency, or
a lawyer's limited leverage and access to information, may make suspension
of judgment the only practicable course.
Id.
57. Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Prob-
lem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 613, 617-18; see also Charles
Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation,
85 Yale LJ. 1060, 1074-75 (1976):
The lawyer acts morally because he helps to preserve and express the auton-
omy of his client vis-A-vis the legal system. It is not just that the lawyer helps
his client accomplish a particular lawful purpose. Pornography may be legal,
but it hardly follows that I perform a morally worthy function if I lend
money or artistic talent to help the pornographer flourish in the exercise of
this right. What is special about legal counsel is that whatever else may stop
the pornographer's enterprise, he should not be stopped because he mistak-
enly believes there is a legal impediment. There is no wrong if a venture
fails for lack of talent or lack of money-no one's rights have been violated.
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some support within current professional norms. Model Rule 1.2(b)
provides that "[a] lawyer's representation of a client, including repre-
sentation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the
client's political, economic, social or moral views or activities." 8 This
rule represents a repudiation of the idea that by agreeing to represen-
tation a lawyer necessarily joins in the intention and object of the cli-
ent. It leaves open the possibility that the lawyer and client are
working simultaneously toward a particular change in the state of af-
fairs surrounding the client with differing intentions and differing
objects.59
Strict devotion to neutrality and its version of role morality would
result in stringent regulation of client acceptance. The stance most
consistent with political liberalism's neutrality would be promulgation
of professional regulations requiring acceptance of almost all prospec-
tive clients, regardless of the lawyer's desire to accept the representa-
tion.6" Such regulations might resemble those governing the English
barristers. "This [cab rank] rule requires a barrister to accept any case
But rights are violated if, through ignorance or misinformation about the
law, an individual refrains from pursuing a wholly lawful purpose. There-
fore, to assist others in understanding and realizing their legal rights is al-
ways morally worthy.
Id.
58. Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 1.2(b).
59. This distinction is particularly important in discussions concerning the role of
criminal defense lawyers, who often represent particular clients, with the intention
and object of limiting the state's power to punish citizens absent proof that the citizen
has engaged in wrongdoing. Rarely is this the intention and object of the criminal
defendant. Most defendants, justly or unjustly, intend to avoid punishment, and their
object is to obtain dismissal of, or acquittal from, the charges made by the state.
Often the incongruence of the lawyer's and client's intentions and objects is of no
significance in the day-to-day decisionmaking of the case. For example, the consider-
ations governing the decision whether the defendant should testify are largely the
same, whether seeking acquittal for the sake of avoiding punishment or for the sake
of enforcing limitations on the state's ability to coerce statements from the accused.
For an interesting discussion of how the differing intentions and objects of lawyer and
client might provide the basis for more refined professional regulations, see Fred C.
Zacharias, Reconceptualizing Ethical Roles, 65 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 169, 172-86 (1997).
60. Under such regulations, American lawyers could give exactly the defense de-
scribed by Professor Murray L. Schwartz:
I represent him because the system demands that I do so. Moreover, I must
cross-examine and try to impeach truthful witnesses, make arguments with
which I personally disagree, decline to introduce probative, adverse evidence
against my client, and attempt to present matter in ways I think personally
are inaccurate, because the system demands that. You may not hold me
substantively, professionally, or morally accountable for that behavior. In-
deed, were I not to behave in this way, I would truly be subject to criticism
on all three grounds of accountability.
Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 Cal. L.
Rev. 669, 673-74 (1978) (citation omitted). Professor Schwartz recognizes that this
defense is subject to attack on the bases that law cannot convert an immoral act to a
moral act by mere flat, or that the system which is offered to justify the role is itself
not morally justified. Id. at 674. My objection is the first. The second is well articu-
lated by David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study (1988).
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that is offered, regardless of what the barrister might privately think of
the client, the case, or the social desirability of the client's winning the
case."
61
Yet American lawyers are not required to accept every client. Ex-
cept in cases of court appointment62 or where representation would
result in violation of the law,63 lawyers are free to accept or decline
prospective representation for almost any reason. "A lawyer is under
no obligation to act as adviser or advocate for every person who may
wish to become his client.... ."I While not recognizing absolute dis-
cretion in the selection of clients, professional norms permit substan-
tial latitude in the selection or rejection of clients.'
Several justifications have been offered for the American rule, the
most persuasive being that the system must respect the autonomy of
lawyers as well as clients. Professor Charles Fried has defended both
the general grant of discretion and the particular exceptions contained
in current professional rules:
Just as the principle of liberty leaves one morally free to choose a
profession according to inclination, so within the profession it leaves
one free to organize his life according to inclination. The lawyer's
liberty-moral liberty-to take up or decline what clients he will is
an aspect of the moral liberty of self to enter into personal relations
freely.
61. Barristers sometimes claim that this rule is a crucial pillar of British jus-
tice, ensuring that unpopular causes or clients need never go without repre-
sentation. Actually, the rule is hedged about with important qualifications.
The rule does not require you, as a barrister, to accept a case for which an
insufficient fee is proposed, nor a case that you are not competent by experi-
ence or specialization to conduct, nor a case that conflicts by way of schedul-
ing with other cases on your calendar. Despite the provisos, the rule does
reflect at least an aspiration to serve all comers disinterestedly. And in fact,
few barristers in England are identified closely with clients of one ideology
or one type of claim rather than another.
Maimon Schwarzschild, Class, National Character, and the Bar Reforms in Britain:
Will There Always Be An England?, 9 Conn. J. Int'l L. 185, 202 (1994). Some authors
suggest that the practical effect of the exceptions has been to allow barristers to avoid
accepting any case they find undesirable. John A. Flood, Barristers' Clerks: The
Law's Middlemen 69-81 (1983).
62. Compare Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 6.2 iih: Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility EC 2-29 (1997) [hereinafter Model Code].
63. Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 1.16(a)(1); Model Code, supra note 62, DR 2-
110(c).
64. Model Code, supra note 62, EC 2-26. Cf Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 6.2
cmt. 1 ("A lawyer ordinarily is not obliged to accept a client whose character or cause
the lawyer regards as repugnant."); see also Restatement of the Law Governing Law-
yers, § 26 introductory note (Am. Law Inst. Tent. Draft No. 5, 1992) and The Ameri-
can Lawyer's Code of Conduct cmt. to ch. III (The Roscoe Pound-Am. Trial
Lawyers Found. Rev. Draft, 1982) ("Except when ordered by a court to represent a
client, a lawyer has complete discretion whether to accept a particular client.").
65. For a more extensive summary of the professional regulations on this issue, see
Charles W. Wolfram, A Lawyer's Duty to Represent Clients, Repugnant and Other-
wise, in The Good Lawyer 214, 216-18 (David Luban, ed. 1983).
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I would not carry this idea through to the bitter end. It has al-
ways been accepted, for instance, that a court may appoint an avail-
able lawyer to represent a criminal defendant who cannot otherwise
find counsel. Indeed, I would be happy to acknowledge the exist-
ence of some moral duty to represent any client whose needs fit
one's particular capacities and who cannot otherwise find counsel.
This is not a large qualification to the general liberty I proclaim.
The obligation is, and must remain, exceptional; it cannot become a
kind of general conscription of the particular lawyer involved. And
the obligation cannot compromise duties to existing clients.66
Another stalwart defender of client and lawyer autonomy, Profes-
sor Monroe Freedman, recognizes the moral consequences of such
discretion:
I also believe that the lawyer's autonomy must be respected. Ex-
cept in the unusual circumstances of a court appointment, the law-
yer is unconstrained by ethical rules in her choice of areas of
practice, causes, and clients .... I do not consider the lawyer's deci-
sion to represent a client or cause to be morally neutral. Rather a
lawyer's choice of client or cause is a moral decision that should be
weighed as such by the lawyer and that the lawyer should be pre-
pared to justify to others.67
For the Christian lawyer, this duty of justification extends first to God,
then to humans. Where the intention or object of the client is evil, the
lawyer must carefully consider the morality of accepting the
representation.
Some guidance in this consideration is provided by the Roman
Catholic doctrine of "cooperation" with evil. The Catechism of the
Catholic Church describes the doctrine of cooperation in the following
terms:
Sin is a personal act. Moreover, we have a responsibility for the sins
committed by others when we cooperate in them: by participating
directly and voluntarily in them; by ordering, advising, praising, or
66. Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-
Client Relation, 85 Yale L.J. 1060, 1078-79 (1976). Others have grounded the lawyer's
discretion in the obligation to screen out nonmeritorious claims and defenses: "The
need for lawyer autonomy in the creation of the attorney-client relationship is pre-
mised on the lawyers' gatekeeping function-his or her ability to screen out meritless,
unjust, or immoral claims by prospective clients, thus aiding the effective administra-
tion of justice." Robert T. Begg, Revoking the Lawyers' License to Discriminate in
New York: The Demise of a Traditional Professional Perogative, 7 Geo. J. Legal Eth-
ics 275, 300 (1993) (arguing for limitations on the discretion of lawyers to reject clients
on the basis of race, national origin, gender, and sexual orientation).
67. Monroe H. Freedman, Ethical Ends and Ethical Means, 41 J. Legal Educ. 55,
56 (1991) (citations omitted). Professor Freedman expands upon this idea in Monroe
H. Freedman, The Lawyer's Moral Obligation of Justification, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 111(1995). His claim that lawyers' must justify their decisions has been challenged. See
Michael E. Tigar, Defending, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 101 (1995).
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approving them; by not disclosing or not hindering them when we
have an obligation to do so; by protecting evil-doers. 68
It is important to note that each of these categories of cooperation
involves either active participation in the wrongdoing or failure to act
when there is an obligation to do so.
A. Formal Cooperation
What constitutes active participation in wrongdoing in particular
concrete circumstances has been the subject of debate among moral
theologians for centuries. Through their debate the distinction of for-
mal versus material cooperation has evolved. Formal cooperation oc-
curs when the cooperator shares the sinful intention of another and
assists in achieving the evil object.69
He can do this either by wanting the evil act performed and doing
something to help bring it about or by making an unambiguous con-
tribution to the performance of the act, that is, by contributing help
that of its nature has no other purpose than to make the sin possible
or to facilitate its commission."
Formal cooperation with sin is always sinful.
A lawyer who knowingly drafted a deed of gift transferring prop-
erty as an inducement for the unmarried donee to engage in sexual
relations with the unmarried donor would be guilty of formal coopera-
tion with the sin of fornication.71 Under most circumstances, drafting
a deed of gift is morally permissible. However, because the lawyer
knew of the client's intention, and because the act of drafting the gift
could have no other purpose than to make the sin possible or to facili-
tate its commission, such cooperation with the client's intention would
be sinful, regardless of whether the lawyer actually willed the creation
of an illicit sexual relationship.
68. Catechism of the Catholic Church, supra note 24, § 1868.
69. "That [cooperation] is formal which concurs in the bad will of the other, and it
cannot be without sin; that [cooperation] is material which concurs only in the bad
action of the other, apart from the cooperator's intention." Germain Grisez, Difficult
Moral Questions 873 (quoting St. Alphonsus Liquori, Theologia moralis) (1997).
70. F.E. Kleug, Sin, Cooperation, in 13 New Catholic Encyclopedia 246 (1967).
71. Cf. Fleming v. Morrison, 72 N.E. 499, 499 (Mass. 1904) (holding a will invalid
for lack of testamentary intent where the evidence showed that at the time the will
was executed the decedent "did not, in fact, then intend it to be his last will and
testament, but intended to have Mary Fleming think that he had made a will in her
favor to induce her to let him sleep with her"). Assuming the court correctly dis-
cerned the testator's intentions, the lawyer was morally culpable for participating in
the testator's lie, as well as the subsequent act of fornication that was induced by the
lie. In my hypothetical, I leave for others the question of whether the lawyer would
be a party to a conspiracy to commit prostitution, or criminal fornication in those
states which prohibit such conduct.
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B. Material Cooperation
Material cooperation with wrongdoing is permissible if the object
and intentions of the cooperator are not evil, and there is sufficiently
grave reason for the cooperator's actions, independent of the fact that
those actions may contribute to the sin of another.
Cooperation is material [as opposed to formal] when it avoids par-
ticipation in the evil intention of the sinner. The material coopera-
tor does not want the sinful action to take place, and there is
ambiguity about what he actually does. His assistance may in fact
contribute to the sin, but it is not of its nature or in the circum-
stances exclusively ordained to the commission of the sin.72
An example of material cooperation by a lawyer would be drafting
employment agreements between migrant farm workers and farmers
that provide for worker housing on the condition that the farmers
have the right to exclude anyone from the premises. Assume at the
time the lawyer drafts the agreement, the state law permits the farm-
ers, as owners, to exclude others from their property, independent of
any contractual provision. The lawyer knows that the farmers intend
to exclude individuals they have identified as "troublemakers." The
farmers define troublemakers to include not only individuals who en-
courage the workers to engage in illegal conduct such as the use or
sale of drugs, but also representatives of local health and legal services
providers.73 They want to include the contractual provision to provide
some documentation of their legal right to exclude anyone. The law-
yer counsels the clients against using the provision unjustly to exclude
people attempting to provide necessary services to the workers, but
drafts the agreement as directed."
72. Klueg, supra note 70, at 246; see also Richard P. McBrien, The Harper Collins
Encyclopedia of Catholicism 366-67 (1995).
73. For similar efforts to exclude drug dealers by public officials, see Herring v.
Chicago Housing Authority, 1993 WL 489767 (N.D. Ill. 1993), and McKenna v. Peek-
skill Housing Authority, 497 F. Supp. 1217 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
74. These facts are based upon State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971), which
held that the owner of a farm may not use trespass statutes to exclude providers of
legal and medical services from property occupied by migrant farm workers. Id. at
374. As to the sinfulness of the owner's conduct, see Second Vatican Council, supra
note 23, para. 27:
Furthermore, whatever is opposed to life itself, such as any type of murder,
genocide, abortion, euthanasia or willful self-destruction, whatever violates
the integrity of the human person, such as mutilation, torments inflicted on
body or mind, attempts to coerce the will itself; whatever insults human dig-
nity, such as subhuman living conditions, arbitrary imprisonment, deporta-
tion, slavery, prostitution, the selling of women and children; as well as
disgraceful working conditions, where men are treated as mere tools for
profit, rather than as free and responsible persons; all these things and
others of their like are infamies indeed. They poison human society, but
they do more harm to those who practice them than those who suffer from
the injury. Moreover, they are a supreme dishonor to the Creator.
Id. at 27.
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The lawyer's actions are not formal cooperation because she did not
join in the farmers' sinful intention and the contract provision is aimed
at both good and evil objects. Through this provision, the farmers
bind themselves to provide housing to the migrant workers. This is a
good object, as evidenced by the treatment of shelter in Scripture."
The provision of shelter and employment is conditioned, in part, upon
the acknowledgment of the farmers' legal right to exclude anyone
from the premises. The lawyer reasonably believes that the farmers
intend to use this power both justly to protect the workers from drug
dealers, and unjustly to exclude those who would provide worthwhile,
and in some cases necessary, services. Yet this immoral use of the
contract provision is not the intention of the lawyer, nor is the provi-
sion the primary source of the farmers' legal right to exclude service
providers. It is clear that the lawyer has not formally cooperated with
the farmers' evil intention.
Whether the lawyer's actions constitute material cooperation is
more ambiguous. By her actions, the attorney has evidenced her disa-
greement with any unjust or sinful intention to oppress the workers
through the use of the contract provision. The drafting of the employ-
ment agreement is not, in and of itself, sinful. Her culpability for any
sinful use of the contract terms then will turn upon whether she had
sufficiently grave reason to draft provisions that may contribute to the
sin of the farmers in their intended denial of important services to the
workers.76 Such reasons might include the farmers' legitimate desire
to obtain the workers' acknowledgment of their authority to exclude
those who threaten the workers' well-being, the existence of a reason-
able chance of influencing the farmers to abandon the proposed evil
act, the ability to mitigate the harm to third parties for the sinful act,
and other human goods to be achieved by the lawyer's actions, in-
dependent of the clients' intent and object. Drafting the agreement
for the farmers and the migrant farm workers may promote several
human goods including the availability of employment and housing to
those often deprived of both. Ideally, in drafting the particular provi-
sion concerning the farmers' right to exclude others from the prop-
erty, the lawyer should persuade the farmers to accept a provision that
merely acknowledges the farmers' existing legal right, rather than a
provision creating a contractual claim that their right to exclude all
75. "A scribe approached him and said, 'Teacher, wherever you go I will come
after you.' Jesus answered him, 'The foxes have lairs, the birds in the sky have nests,
but the Son of Man has nowhere to lay his head.' Matthew 8:19-20. The Old Testa-
ment illustrates the value of this good by its protection in the law, see Deuteronomy
10:11, forbidding a creditor to enter the debtor's house to obtain payment, and the
loss of a place to live was understood as one of the greatest losses that could occur,
e.g., Lamentations 2:2 and 5:2). Pontifical Commission lustitia et Paw, What Have
You Done to Your Homeless Brother? The Church and the Housing Problem (1987),
discusses the Christian duty to work toward universal availability of housing,.
76. See Kleug, supra note 70, at 245-46.
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others is grounded in the voluntary agreement of the workers. 77 This
point should be discussed with the clients, and the lawyer should ac-
cept their decision and draft the provision according to their instruc-
tions. Even if the lawyer is directed to draft the provision to provide a
contractual claim in addition to the existing legal right, the intentions
and the object of the lawyer in representing the farmers in this matter
are good, and the circumstances do not suggest that the evil contained
in the clients' multiple objects and mixed intentions is sufficient to
preclude representation.78
C. Doctrine of Double Effect
The example of drafting the migrant workers' contract and the
weighing of the lawyer's good intentions and object with the clients'
mixed intentions and objects reflects the sort of prudential judgment
Christian lawyers must exercise. This weighing of intentions and ob-
jects is governed by the doctrine of double effect, which recognizes
limited moral responsibility for evil consequences that are not in-
tended, but are foreseen, by the actor.
Theologians commonly teach that four conditions must be verified
in order that a person may legitimately perform such an act. (1)
The act itself must be morally good or at least indifferent. (2) The
agent may not positively will the bad effect but may merely permit
it. If he could attain the good effect without the bad effect, he
should do so. The bad effect is sometimes said to be indirectly vol-
untary. (3) The good effect must flow from the action at least as
immediately (in the order of causality, though not necessarily in the
order of time) as the bad effect. In other words, the good effect
must be produced directly by the action, not by the bad effect.
Otherwise, the agent would be using a bad means to a good end,
which is never allowed. (4) The good effect must be sufficiently
desirable to compensate for the allowing of the bad effect.79
The principle of double effect guides the Catholic lawyer through the
moral assessment of a particular act that is not intentionally evil nor
aimed at achieving an intrinsically evil object. As noted above, it is
always forbidden to formally cooperate with evil, whether acting on
evil intentions or seeking evil objects, but there are instances when it
is morally permissible to act, with right intentions and objects, fore-
77. I am grateful to Professor Monroe Freedman for suggesting this point to me.
78. Additional examples of the application of the cooperation with evil doctrine to
lawyering decisions are contained in Robert J. Muise, Note, Professional Responsibil-
ity for Catholic Lawyers: The Judgment of Conscience, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 771,
786-87 (1996).
79. 4 New Catholic Encyclopedia, Double Effect, Principle of, at 1021 (1967). An
extensive discussion of this principle by both supporters and detractors can be found
in Forum, Double Effect: Theoretical Function and Bioethical Implications, 16 J. Med.
& Phil. 5 (1991).
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seeing that the actions will permit another to satisfy an evil intention
or attain an evil object.
In considering whether to accept representation, the lawyer must
identify the actions that representation would require, and determine
that the acts required of the lawyer are good, or at least morally neu-
tral. Representation that requires the lawyer to advocate the per-
formance of evil acts, or the total disregard of religious obligations, or
the irrelevance of religious beliefs, results in evil acts by the lawyer,
and thus such representation cannot be accepted by the Catholic law-
yer. Examples of such prohibited representation include arguing for a
court order permitting a minor to consent to the performance of an
abortion80 or the imposition of the death penalty when other effective
means of protecting the public are available.8'
In addition to avoiding evil acts as a part of the proposed represen-
tation, the lawyer must not intend or will the evil consequences that
unavoidably flow from the contemplated representation. Returning
to the earlier example of the lawyer drafting the migrant worker em-
ployment agreements, the lawyer is aware that the farmers intend to
use the provision limiting access to company housing in order to ex-
clude healthcare workers and legal services providers, yet that is not
the lawyer's intended use of the contract or provision. The contract
binds the farmers to provide housing, and the provision describing
their authority to exclude others from the housing may merely restate
the law, creating no new rights in the employers/landlords. Even if
the provision excluding others creates a contractual right in the farm-
ers on the basis that the workers have voluntarily relinquished any
right to object to the farmers' conduct, the lawyer's discussions with
her clients evidence her disagreement with using the power to exclude
80. The Tennessee Bar Association has taken the position that a pro-life Catholic
lawyer has a professional obligation to accept court appointed representation of a
minor seeking an abortion. This opinion has been sharply criticized on several
grounds. See Teresa Stanton Collett, Professional versus Moral Duty: Accepting Ap-
pointments in Unjust Civil Cases, 32 Wake Forest L. Rev. 635 (1997) (arguing that the
position of the Tennessee Bar Association departs from the traditional American un-
derstanding of the voluntary nature of the client-attorney relationship and asserting
that recognizing lawyers' moral independence is crucial to maintaining the integrity of
the profession of law); Howard Lesnick, The Religious Lawyer in a Pluralist Society,
66 Fordham L. Rev. 1469 (criticizing the Tennessee opinion as contrary to the ideal of
a religiously pluralistic society); Ernest F. Lidge, III, The Lawyer's Moral Autonomy
and Formal Opinion 140, 33 Tenn. BJ. 12, Jan.Feb. 1997, at 13-14 (arguing that law-
yers should be allowed to consider their religious beliefs when taking cases so as not
to violate their ethical duty to represent their client zealously).
81. Muise, supra note 78, at 771, provides additional comment on this example; see
also George Kannar, Federalizing Death, 44 Buff. L. Rev. 325, 331-37 (1996) (describ-
ing the federal legislation exempting prolife prosecutors from representing the gov-
emient in cases where the death penalty is sought). On the issue of Catholic judges
imposing the death penalty, see John H. Garvey and Amy V. Coney, Catholic Judges
in Capital Cases, 81 Marquette L. Rev. 303 (1998) and the critique contained in Rob-
ert Thttle, Death's Casuistry 81 Marquette L. Rev. __ (forthcoming).
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visitors from employee housing to deprive workers of contact with
health and legal services providers. It is clear that in drafting the con-
tract, she does not will these particular consequences.
The third element of the principle of double effect requires that the
good object of the lawyer motivating the acceptance of representation
must not be achieved through the evil effects of the client's act. An
example of representation precluded by this element would be the
sort of "political crisis lawyering" advocated by some, where the law-
yer seeks strict enforcement of unjust laws in order to encourage pub-
lic outrage and pressure for legislative change.8" The lawyer seeking
to reform landlord/tenant law to include a "repair and deduct" rem-
edy for breach of the warranty of habitability might be tempted to
encourage landlords to evict unemployed tenants who fail to make
rent payments because the tenants used the money to make necessary
repairs. The good effect of legislative reform of unjust laws cannot
justify the lawyer's actively cooperating in the landlord's unjust, but
legal, eviction of the unemployed tenant.8 3
The final element of the principle requires the lawyer to balance the
good to be obtained by accepting the representation against the evil to
be avoided by refusing. Although considering the foreseeable conse-
quences of the act, this element differs from secular consequentialist
analysis. The principle of double effect excludes willing an evil object,
or seeking to benefit from evil consequences. By ruling such inten-
tions and objects off-limits, the principle reduces the temptation to
disobey God in the hope of attaining temporal good. The object of
these limitations is succinctly summarized in the scripture, "What
profit would a man show if he were to gain the whole world and de-
stroy himself in the process?"' The principle of double effect does
not allow believers to gamble in this way in deluded hope of both
gaining the world while retaining their souls.
One might suggest that the fourth element of the principle of
double effect simplifies the lawyer's moral analysis, since many law-
yers might overstate the foreseeable evil consequences of rejecting the
representation. They would argue, "If I refuse this case, the prospec-
tive client will merely seek out another attorney who will not even try
to limit the evil, so it is better that I take the case and engage in dam-
age control to the greatest extent possible." 5 Such reasoning is unac-
ceptable under both the standard conception of lawyering and under
the duty of Christian lawyers to avoid evil. It subverts the principle of
client autonomy justifying such representation under the secularist
82. See David Luban, Conscientious Lawyers for Conscientious Lawbreakers, 52
U. Pitt. L. Rev. 793, 803-05 (1991).
83. Cf. Freedman, Understanding Lawyers' Ethics, supra note 14, at 49-50.
84. Matthew 16:26.
85. See Michael J. Broyde, Practicing Criminal Law: A Jewish Law Analysis of
Being a Prosecutor or Defense Attorney, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 1141, 1148 (1998).
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standard conception because the lawyer's intent is not to achieve the
objective of the client, but to change the objective of the client and,
failing to effect such changes, to minimize the success of the client in
achieving his or her objectives. This is wrong because it betrays the
trust of the client.
The argument of "if I don't, somebody else will" is also unavailing
under the Christian conception of lawyering. This argument substi-
tutes unknown (and unknowable) actions of others for the difficult
moral analysis of reasonably foreseeable effects of accepting the rep-
resentation. Such reasoning unrealistically minimizes the inherent
danger to the lawyer's spiritual well-being from representation of
those with evil intent or objects and maximizes the potential good to
be achieved through the lawyer's influence on the client. While it is
permissible to consider both the possible consequence that the Chris-
tian lawyer will influence the client to abandon the evil intention or
objects, and the possibility that another lawyer will not seek to exert
such moral persuasion, the analysis of double effect does not begin or
end there. The error inherent in the statement "if I don't, somebody
else will" is that it is offered as both the beginning and ending of
moral analysis.
The principle of double effect permits moral analysis of actions that
foreseeably will result in both good and evil effects. It maintains the
believer's commitment to the existence of objective good and the
avoidance of direct participation in evil while recognizing that pure
good is largely unattainable in this life. Unlike the consequentialist,
the believer's judgment cannot be governed exclusively by calculation
of net good or evil to be achieved according to human understanding
of foreseeable consequences. For Christians, the fallibility of such cal-
culations is conclusively proven by the fact that redemption came
through death on the cross, an instrument of Roman torture and op-
pression. Reduced to its most colloquial expression, "Who woulda
thunk it?" Only those who had faith in the promises of the Living
God.
The believing Catholic must adhere to the law of God, with confi-
dence that the law represents the true "greatest good" for each indi-
vidual, and thus for all. The principle of double effect is consistent
with this obligation through its insistence that evil can be neither the
intent nor the object of the actor.
D. Avoiding Scandal
Even when Catholic lawyers have properly analyzed the intentions
and objects of the prospective representation and determined that the
representation is permissible, the Christian duty to avoid giving scan-
dal may preclude acceptance of representation.
Scandal has two meanings in theological discourse. The first mean-
ing is the meaning of Christ when He asked His disciples whether they
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were scandalized by his teaching on the Eucharist.86 To hear Christ
proclaim that salvation came through the eating of his flesh and the
drinking of His blood truly must have tested the devotion of His fol-
lowers.87 Yet the scandal they undoubtedly felt-a sense of outrage
or shock-is not the type of scandal that Christians must avoid giving.
Christ was bound to proclaim the truth, regardless of the ability or
willingness of His listeners to understand. Similarly, Christians are
not excused from their obligations to obey God to avoid shocking or
outraging others by the acts that are commanded by God.88
David Hoffnan articulated a similar principle for American lawyers
over one hundred and fifty years ago.
What is wrong, is not the less so from being common. and though
few dare to be singular, even in a right cause, I am resolved to make
my own, and not the conscience of others, my sole guide. What is
morally wrong, cannot be professionally right, however it may be
sanctioned by time or custom. It is better to be right with a few, or
even none, than wrong, though with a multitude. If, therefore, there
be among my brethren, any traditional moral errors of practice,
they shall be studiously avoided by me, though in so doing, I unhap-
pily come in collision with what is (erroneously I think) too often
denominated by the policy of the profession. Such cases, fortu-
nately, occur but seldom-but when they do, I shall trust to that
moral firmness of purpose which shrinks from no consequences, and
which can be intimidated by no authority however ancient or
respectable.89
In the context of client selection, contemporary professional regula-
tions contain a parallel admonition. The Model Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that "[r]egardless of his personal feelings, a
lawyer should not decline representation because a client or a cause is
unpopular or community reaction is adverse."9 Commentary in the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct expands only slightly on the
Code's statement: "Legal representation should not be denied to peo-
ple who are unable to afford legal services, or whose cause is contro-
86. John 6:62.
87. John 6:22-71.
88. See L.G. Miller, Scandal, 12 New Catholic Encyclopedia 1112 (1967).
It should be added that the fulfillment of positive precepts, whether divine
or human, if necessary for salvation, may never be omitted in order to avoid
scandal. Much less would it be permissible to do something essentially evil,
such as lying, stealing, or blaspheming, for the purpose of preventing the sin
of another. There may even be circumstances in which one is bound to con-
tinue on a good course of action even though, through ignorance, the weak
are scandalized; for it would not be right, for the sake of avoiding scandal, to
inflict serious harm or loss on oneself or the community.
Id.
89. David Hoffman, Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment, repro-
duced in A Course of Legal Study 33 (1836).
90. Model Code, supra note 62, EC 2-27.
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versial or the subject of popular disapproval." 91 Certainly as followers
of Christ, who several times described his mission as ministering to the
outcast or lost,92 it would be wrong to reject a prospective client be-
cause of public shock or outrage at the defense of the innocent or
weak.93
The duty of Christians to avoid giving scandal involves a different
type of scandal. Christ talked of this second type of scandal when
exhorting the disciples to avoid drawing others into sin. "It is impossi-
ble but that offenses [against God] will come; but woe unto him
through whom they come. It would be better for him that a millstone
were hanged about his neck, and he cast into the sea, than that he
should offend one of these little ones." 9 The duty to avoid giving
scandal requires Christians abstain from acts that encourage others to
sin.9' For this reason, Christian lawyers must consider, not whether
the prospective representation is unpopular, but whether the lawyer's
advocacy on behalf of the client would lead others into sin. This de-
termination often involves consideration of perception and promi-
nence of the proposed representation, as well as the degree of public
91. Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 1.2, cmt. 3.
92. E.g., Luke 19:1-10 (explaining Christ's decision to eat with Zacchaeus).
93. I do not underestimate the very real harm that an attorney can suffer due to
public outrage or shock. David Golderger, Clients Everyone Hates, Litig., Spring 1995,
at 10; see alsoTgar, supra note 67, at 103 (discussing the tragedy of the 1995
Oklahoma City bombing); Monroe H. Freedman, The Lawyer's Moral Obligation of
Justification, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 111, 112 (1995) (discussing lawyers' defending of unpopu-
lar clients); cf Sacher v. U.S., 343 U.S. 1, 19 (1952) (J. Black, dissenting) ("[I]t is
difficult to escape the impression that [the trial judge's] inferences against the lawyers
were colored, however unconsciously, by his natural abhorrence for the unpatriotic
and treasonable designs attributed to their Communist leader clients."); Guam Soc'y
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v. Ada, 100 F.3d 691, 699 (9th Cir. 1996) ("There
is no doubt in my mind that this case was deemed extremely undesirable in the com-
munity and that local counsel faced unusual and trying personal and professional
pressures during the pendancy of this lawsuit.").
94. Luke 17:1-2. The Catholic Study Bible translates this passage:
He said to his disciples, 'Things that cause sin will inevitably occur, but woe
to the person through whom they occur. It would be better for him if a
millstone were put around his neck and he be thrown into the sea than for
him to cause one of these little ones to sin.
Luke 17:1-2; see also Matthew 18:6 ("On the other hand, it would be better for anyone
who leads astray one of these little ones who believe in me, to be drowned in the
depths of the sea."); I Corinthians 8:12 ("When you sin against your brothers and
wound their weak consciences, you are sinning against Christ.").
95. Catechism of the Catholic Church, supra note 24, § 2284-87:
Scandal is an attitude or behavior which leads another to do evil. The person
who gives scandal becomes his neighbor's tempter. He damages virtue and
integrity, he may even draw his brother into spiritual death. Scandal is a
grave offense if by deed or omission another is deliberately led into a grave
offense.
Scandal takes on a particular gravity by reason of the authority of those
who cause it or the weakness of those who are scandalized.
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identification of the lawyer with the prospective client and with the
Christian community.
This concern for the effect of the representation on others is not
foreign to the secular dialogue concerning a lawyer's duties. David
Wilkins has asserted similar secular objections to the decision by
Anthony Griffin, a black lawyer, who agreed to represent the Ku Klux
Klan ("KKK" or "Klan") in resisting the Texas attorney general's ef-
forts to obtain an organizational membership list.9 6 He analyzes Grif-
fin's representation of the Klan from the perspective of group identity,
and argues that the burden of public justification is heavier for a black
lawyer representing the Klan than for a white lawyer. This is because:
1) a black lawyer's presence at counsel table improves the Klan's
chances of successfully resisting the State's order to disclose its mem-
bership lists; 2) acceptance of representation suggests that "even the
Klan's most bitter enemies believe that its arguments merit careful
consideration"; 3) his presence suggests that the Klan is "merely a
'fringe' organization whose 'speech' causes no real harm"; and 4)
other blacks will feel a special sense of harm when the Klan is repre-
sented by a black lawyer.97 Wilkins asserts that these consequences
should be part of Griffin's moral deliberation:
Although [Griffin's] racial identity does not define him, his moral,
economic, and spiritual connection to the black community does
have an important moral claim on his decisions, at least when those
decisions are likely to have predictable consequences for other
blacks. He has an obligation to weigh these race-based considera-
tions against both legitimate professional duties (acquired by virtue
of his status as a lawyer) and his unique commitments as an autono-
mous member of society. 98
Wilkins' concern for the increased likelihood of success is more
properly considered in the principle of double effect. His concern for
the special sense of harm felt by other members of the black commu-
nity is comparable to the first type of scandal discussed above and
should not morally bar the lawyer from accepting representation with
a good intent and object.99 His second and third concerns, however,
raise the specter of judicial legitimization of an association committed
96. David B. Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment: Should a Black
Lawyer Represent the Ku Klux Klan?, 63 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1030 (1995). The events
surrounding Griffin's representation of the Klan are described in Helen Thompson,
Freedom Fighter: Galveston Lawyer Anthony Griffin is Committed to Protecting the
First Amendment Even if it Means Defending the Ku Klux Klan, reprinted in Robert F.
Cochran, Jr. & Teresa S. Collett, Cases and Materials on the Rules of the Legal Pro-
fession 37-42 (1996).
97. Wilkins, supra note 96, at 1042.
98. Id. at 1043.
99. W'lkins characterizes this harm as "the psychic injury to blacks in Vidor of
seeing a black lawyer standing up for their persecutors." Id. at 1056.
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to racial segregation. Such legitimization threatens the goals of racial
equality and harmony throughout contemporary American society.
These concerns properly would be considered by a Catholic lawyer
asked to represent the Klan, regardless of the lawyer's race. The Cat-
echism of the Catholic Church teaches that "they are guilty of scandal
who establish laws or social structures leading to the decline of morals
and the corruption of religious practice, or to 'social conditions that,
intentionally or not, make Christian conduct and obedience to the
Commandments difficult and practically impossible.""' The Knights
of the Ku Klux Klan publicly affirm a belief in white racial pride,
American nationalism, and Christianity.' 0 ' As an association, it is
100. Catechism of the Catholic Church, supra note 24, at § 2286.
101. White Civil Rights Now (visited Feb. 19, 1998) <httpll/www.k-k-k.com/
belief.html>:
Things the liberal media told you that just aren't true.
The Klan hates black people.
This is a lie and the liberal media knows it. We believe everyone has a
right to be proud of their race, which means White people have a right to be
proud also. Therefore we believe that anti-White policies should be dis-
carded and that people should be hired, promoted, and given scholarships
according to their ability and not because we feel sorry for them or because
they have the "politically correct" color of skin.
The Klan is against Catholics.
That is another liberal media lie. We believe that all Christians, regardless
of their religious preference, need to work in harmony for the future of our
children and Western Christian Civilization.
If you join the Klan, you will have to break the law and commit crimes against
black people.
The liberal media says this even though it is not true because they want
you to be afraid of joining the Klan and going to jail. They know that if
White people ever join together we will be able to stop the destruction of
our race and nation. This lie is told to keep the good, decent, and honorable
Christian people from ever joining our movement. Klan members take a
pledge not to commit crimes.
What the Klan really is.
The Klan is a gathering of White Christian men and women who are
joined together because of the common bond they share by blood and faith.
Each person is an individual and we do not attempt to do your thinking for
you.
The Klan is the oldest, largest, and most professional Whites Rights group
in the world. Our membership draws from all walks of life. We are commit-
ted to upholding and defending Western Christian civilization.
The Klan Political Agenda
America First!
The very first responsibility of our government is to protect the welfare
(jobs, health, future) of AMERICANS-not those in Mexico, Vietnam,
Somalia, Haiti, or some other Third World country. It is time to take
America back.
Drug Testing for Welfare Recipients.
Not everyone who is on welfare is taking drugs. We are aware of that, but
there are many, especially in housing projects in large urban areas, who are
taking drugs. If they have enough money for drugs, they don't need your
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dedicated to continuing racial division and de facto segregation."l 2
Both goals are contrary to the teachings of Scripture and the
Church.10 3
money. If a welfare recipient is a drug user, their welfare check, food
stamps, public housing, and etc. should be cut.
Protect America's Birthright.
If the Klan were in political power, laws would be enacted that would
prevent American industry and property from being sold to foreigners.
America should be owned by Americans-not Japanese, Arabs or Jews.
Do away with Affirmative Action Programs.
People in America should be hired, promoted or given scholarships based
on ability, not because they have the right color of skin or because we feel
sorry for them or because we are trying to appease some kind of self-in-
flicted guilt.
Protect American Jobs.
Americans are losing jobs to foreign nations because our industry is mov-
ing to Mexico to obtain cheap labor, which is often only 60 or 70 cents an
hour. American industry is also enticed to move to Mexico in order to save
millions because of non-existing environmental laws. The criminals in Wash-
ington have passed NAFTA and are now selling us out with GATI.
Close our Border.
The flood of illegal aliens coming across our borders needs to be stopped.
If we can put 43,000 soldiers in South Korea to protect their borders, 500,000
soldiers in Saudi Arabia to protect their borders, why cannot we put troops
on our borders to protect our country from the invasion of illegal aliens? We
must protect the future of our children, not the future of the children of
Mexico.
Outlaw homosexuality and interracial marriages.
Until 20 or so year ago, nearly all states had 'sodomy' and miscegenation
laws and statutes that were strictly enforced. Since that time they have been
repealed or are ignored, the results are obvious with the plague of AIDS
now ravaging our land. Both of these abominations against God and nature
must be stopped if America is ever to return to the great Christian nation it
once was.
102. Helen Thompson, Freedom Fighter: Galveston Lawyer Anthony Griffin is
Committed to Protecting the First Amendment Even if it Means Defending the Ku Klux
Klan, in Cochran & Collett, supra note 96, at 41 ("'We aren't supremacists,' he
[Michael Barns, the Titan of the Realm of Texas, Knights of the KKK] says, drawing a
fine distinction, 'We are segregationists.').
103. "There does not exist among you Jew or Greek, slave or free man, male or
female. All are one in Christ Jesus." Galatians 3:28. "There is no Greek or Jew here,
circumcised or uncircumcised, foreigner, Scythian, slave, or free man. Rather, Christ
is everything in all of you." Colossians 3:11. "Every form of social or cultural discrim-
ination in fundamental personal rights on the grounds of sex, race, color, social condi-
tions, language, or religion must be curbed and eradicated as incompatible with God's
design." Second Vatican Council, supra note 23, para. 29, quoted with approval in
Catechism of the Catholic Church, supra note 24, § 1935; cf. James 2:1-13 (admonition
against the sin of partiality); Pope Paul VI, On the Development of the Peoples
(Populorum Progressio) para. 63 (1967) ("It [racism] is still an obstacle to collabora-
tion among disadvantaged nations and a cause of division and hatred within countries
whenever individuals and families see the inviolable rights of the human person held
in scorn, as they themselves are unjustly subjected to a regime of discrimination be-
cause of their race or their colour."); National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Broth-
ers and Sisters to Us (Nov. 14, 1979) (discussing the sin of racism).
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By defending the Klan's associational rights, the Catholic lawyer
necessarily would seek a judicial pronouncement that individuals have
the right to associate to further the immoral goal of promoting racism.
Such representation and the resulting pronouncement (if the lawyer is
successful) threaten to mislead Christians in their search for the truth
concerning relationships with members of other racial groups. Since
scandalizing the faithful would not be the intent or object of the law-
yer in accepting or rejecting the representation, it is not determinative
of the morality of the representation. Because it is a foreseeable ef-
fect of accepting representation, however, it is a relevant considera-
tion in analyzing whether the representation is permissible under the
principle of double effect.
As a part of the analysis under the principle of double effect, the
lawyer is obligated to determine whether the representation could be
accepted and conducted in such a manner to obtain the good of pro-
tecting associational rights without risking the scandalous effect of
leading others into the sin of racism. It is possible to minimize the
scandalizing effects of such representation in two ways, both of which
are problematic under the standard conception of lawyering. The
first, and most obvious, way is to decline the representation. This res-
olution is incompatible with the standard conception's ideal of equal
access to the law, and the underlying premise of neutrality by the state
inherent in political liberalism.
The second way to minimize the scandalous effect of an otherwise
good or morally neutral act is to explain the act so that observers un-
derstand and will not be drawn into the sin. This was the route fol-
lowed by Anthony Griffin in his representation of the Klan.'o- He
distanced himself regularly and vehemently from the organizing prin-
ciples of his client. Yet, as Wilkins acknowledges, Griffin's actions
raise complex issues of professional morality.10 5
Is such public distancing of oneself from the client consistent vith
professional norms, reasonable client expectations, and/or the best in-
terest of the client? Professional norms provide contradictory indica-
tions on whether lawyers may pursue representation with differing
intentions and objects. The Code of Professional Responsibility ex-
horts lawyers to zealously represent the interests of their clients.'0 6
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct permit consensual limits on
the objectives lawyers seek by agreements between client and law-
104. "With few exceptions, Griffin has done everything in his power to prevent
others from misstating or misusing his position." W'ilkins, supra note 96, at 1067.
105. Id. at 1053-56.
106. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 7 (1997) ("A lawyer should
represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law.").
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yer.1°7 Fiduciary duties bind lawyers to serve their clients with undi-
vided loyalty.1°8
Separate professional questions surround the conduct engaged in by
lawyers seeking to distance themselves from their clients. Public
statements regarding any legal matter threaten client confidentiality
and attorney-work product privileges. 10 9 Discussion of matters cur-
rently in litigation raise questions about the effect of those statements
upon the triers of fact. Disassociating oneself from the clients or their
cause may adversely affect the ability of the clients to achieve their
objectives."' In light of these dangers, it is not surprising that the
professional codes fail to provide clear guidance on whether lawyers
may publicly distance themselves from their clients.
Applying the most positive description to the conduct of lawyers
publicly distancing themselves from the intentions and objects of their
clients, it is nothing more than public affirmation of the moral reality
that not all cooperative activity results from a shared intention."'
Public affirmation of the lawyer's differing intentions and objects pre-
serves the distinctive individuality of both lawyer and client, allowing
each to give a public accounting of his or her moral reasoning. This, in
turn, permits others to engage in the sort of fraternal affirmation or
correction inherent in living in a moral community. Wilkins's article is
an example of exactly this. His affirmation of Anthony Griffin's integ-
rity in resolving the complex question of whether a black lawyer
should represent the Ku Klux Klan, while arguing that Griffin failed
to give proper weight to each aspect of the representation, is the sort
of affirmation and correction that may be offered in moral dialogue." 2
A more critical description of the conduct of lawyers publicly chas-
tising or disavowing the constitutive purpose of the client would sug-
gest that lawyers are using their representation of clients as means to
the lawyers' ends, while publicly expressing indifference, or even hos-
tility, to the continuing well-being of the client. Such a vision is con-
sistent with secular consequentialist moral reasoning where the
determinative question is "What conduct achieves the greatest good?"
but evidences a total disregard for the fact that the lawyer seeks to
obtain the "greatest good" at the client's expense. It is a radical de-
parture from the standard conception's ideal of partisanship which is
107. Model Rules, supra note 7, Rule 1.2.
108. E.g., Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, 2 Legal Malpractice § 14.1 (4th ed.
1996) (defining the scope of fiduciary obligations).
109. Model Rules supra note 7, Rules 1.6 and 1.9 set out the limitations of
confidentiality.
110. Wilkins, supra note 96, at 1036-40; see also State v. Holland, 921 P.2d 430, 432
(Utah 1996) (describing defense counsel's use of client's testimony to illustrate the
impropriety of executing another client who was less "worthy" of the death penalty).
111. See notes 72-78 & accompanying text.
112. Wilkins, supra note 96, at 1040-43.
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most persuasively defended on the basis that zealous advocacy pro-
motes the good of human dignity or autonomy.'1 3
Elsewhere I have argued that there has been too little attention
given to the distinction between these human goods and that defend-
ers of the standard conception have mistakenly assumed that auton-
omy is a synonym for human dignity. 114 I will not rehearse those
arguments here. Instead I want to explore whether human associa-
tions can assert a moral claim for the same respect due human beings.
E. Distinguishing Human Persons From Human Associations
The Ku Klux Klan is a voluntary association of human persons.
Voluntary human associations are formed in response to the social na-
ture of human persons and their need to serve and be served. 15 Un-
like people, whose individual intrinsic worth must be acknowledged
by all Christians,'16 particular human associations enjoy no inherent
value beyond the purpose and activities of the association. Such as-
sociations can be affiliations of people seeking to cooperatively en-
gage in acts of justice and charity toward others, and thus contribute
to the flourishing of the human person and community. Associations
can also be formed by people for the primary purpose of jointly pursu-
ing intrinsically evil objectives, thus denigrating the human person and
community. It is the duty of Christians to support and participate in
associations of the first kind while condemning and opposing the pur-
pose and activities of the second.
When individuals seek to act in accordance with their best under-
standing of the good, the lawyer serves God and neighbor by limiting
governmental coercion of action contrary to conscience. Application
of this principle to human associations is more difficult. The moral
strength of an association's claim for cooperation by others is directly
proportional to the legitimacy of the association's purposes and ob-
jects. When the purpose of the association is evil, but the object
sought is permissible, the Christian lawyer should evaluate the pro-
posed cooperation to determine if it is morally permissible. If the act
is permissible, the person may join the association's effort to achieve
the object but should not join in its evil purpose. Arguably, Anthony
Griffin's representation of the Klan falls into this category. Another
example of such cooperation would be a lawyer assisting a medical
device company in paying just compensation to settle a product liabil-
113. Freedman, Ethics, supra note 14, at 65-86.
114. Teresa Stanton Collett, Life and Death Lawyering: Dignity in the Absence of
Autonomy, 1 J. Inst. Study L. Ethics 177 (1996).
115. This aspect of human nature is evidenced in the oldest creation story and con-
tinues to be a theme throughout Scripture: "The Lord God said: 'It is not good for
the man to be alone. I will make a suitable partner for him."' Genesis 2:18.
116. "God created man in his image; in the divine image he created him; male and
female he created them." Genesis 1:27; see also Catechism of the Catholic Church,
supra note 24, at §§ 355-57.
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ity claim where the primary intent of the corporation in settling is not
to deal justly with the injured consumer, but to avoid publicity and the
attendant claims by other injured users of the product. So long as the
lawyer does not join in this unjust intent, the lawyer has not formally
cooperated with the wrongdoing of the client.
When the object of the association is evil, regardless of the intent of
the association, the lawyer and the community should not assist the
association in achieving its object. For example, a medical facility
seeking to expand its service to include abortion has no moral claim
for assistance, even in those instances where the intention of the asso-
ciation is to protect women against the dangers of self-induced abor-
tions or to promote the ability of women to time the birth of their
children. 117
Associations formed for evil purposes pursuing evil objects have no
moral claim to the lawyer's services, and should not be assisted. As-
serting a claim by the Klan that de jure segregation should be permis-
sible in localities where a majority of the electorate vote for it is an
example of such prohibited representation.
Proper moral analysis of any proposed representation depends, in
part, upon the ability of the lawyer to discern the prospective client's
intentions and objects. Rarely is this so simple as the client announc-
ing, "I am the Prince of Darkness, and I would like for you to repre-
sent me in the purchasing of human souls" or "I have been sent to you
by God, and I would like for you to represent me in my attempts to
transmit His grace to the following people." If such an announcement
were made by a prospective client, few lawyers would accept the state-
ments as true on their face, and most lawyers would be extremely un-
easy about accepting the statements even after an appropriate
showing of supernatural powers.
On the rare occasions that clients clearly articulate predominantly
evil or good intentions, lawyers often perceive a conflict between their
professional obligations and their moral duties. No lawyer is obli-
gated to help a criminal defendant obtain revenge for past wrongs by
implicating an innocent man in a murder, yet at least one lawyer be-
lieved that professional regulations rendered him powerless to re-
fuse." 8 Similarly, no lawyer is prohibited from assisting clients in
117. The Church acknowledges the moral legitimacy of timing the birth of children,
but proclaims the moral limitations on means used to achieve this object. Pope Paul
VI, On Human Life, supra note 56, para. 16; Janet E. Smith, The Moral Use of Natural
Family Planning, in Why Humanae Vitae Was Right: A Reader 461-71 (1993). The
Church teaching on abortion can be found in Pope John Paul II, The Gospel of Life
(Evangelium Vitae) (1994).
118. Professor William Hodes describes the case of Henry Drake who was con-
victed of first degree murder on the perjurious testimony of "Pop" Campbell. Pop
Campbell's lawyer knew his client was lying during his testimony, but erroneously
believed that the duty of confidentiality precluded any action adverse to the client. W.
William Hodes, What Ought to Be Done-What Can Be Done-When the Wrong Per-
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resisting unjust laws through legal means, yet the professional rules
governing assistance in acts of civil disobedience are far from clear.119
The mixed intentions and multiple objects of prospective clients, be
they individuals or associations, require careful consideration by the
lawyer in deciding whether to accept the representation. The follow-
ing example illustrates this point:
An orthodox Roman Catholic lawyer is asked to represent the man-
ufacturer of baby formula seeking authorization from the govern-
ment of a Third World nation to market powdered baby formula to
new mothers in that country. Most communities in the country rely
upon natural water supplies (rivers, lakes and wells), which have not
been treated to insure purity. The number one cause of infant
death is dehydration due to diarrhea.120
son is in Jail or About to Be Executed? An Invitation to a Multi-Disciplined Inquirly
and a Detour About Law School Pedagogy, 29 Loy. LA. L. Rev. 1547, 1568-74 (1996).
119. The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy defines civil disobedience as "a de-
liberate violation of the law, committed in order to draw attention to or rectify per-
ceived injustices in the law or policies of a state." Cambridge Dictionary of
Philosophy 124 (1995). The Encyclopedia of Ethics (1992) distinguishes civil disobe-
dience from conscientious disobedience. 1 Encyclopedia of Ethics 165 (1992). The
first is characterized by an intention to influence a change in law or policy, while the
second is premised upon the protester's refusal to either perpetrate or become a vic-
tim of the injustice resulting from compliance with a particular law. Id. Rule 1.2 of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct supra note 7 contains a similar distinction.
Rule 1.2(d) permits lawyers to assist clients in making "a good faith effort to deter-
mine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law," while forbidding all other
assistance in "criminal or fraudulent" conduct. In interpreting this rule, commenta-
tors distinguish cases involving "test case litigation" where the clients believe that the
law is invalid or inapplicable, from cases where the clients do not reasonably foresee
escaping legal sanction, yet refuse to obey laws requiring complicity with evil acts. See
1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering: A Handbook
on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct § 1.2, at 513-14 (2d ed, 1996).
120. These facts are an adaptation of a continuing international controversy.
Nestle S.A., a multinational corporation, began marketing infant formula in
developing countries in the 1950's. By 1968, a controversy had developed
over Nestle's mass advertising and marketing campaigns. This campaign in-
cluded giving away free samples to new mothers at hospitals and the use of
billboards and other pictorial images. However, the most widely criticized
aspects of Nestle's campaign was the use of women dressed as nurses in the
villages of developing countries. These "nurses" handed out free samples of
infant formula, thus giving the impression that the Nestle product was en-
dorsed by the medical profession. The campaign also gave the impression
that the infant formula was a safe and easy-to-use substitute for breast milk
in developing countries.
Unfortunately, as marketed, the product was neither safe nor easy to use.
The results were tragic. The problems inherent in developing countries-
illiteracy, poverty, and unsanitary conditions-combined with the deceptive-
ness of Nestle's marketing practices resulted in the deaths of hundreds of
infants.
The immediate cause of this tragedy was product misuse. What is shock-
ing is that in this instance, simple "misuse" led to death. Mothers, not given
any meaningful instruction on the proper use of infant formula, mixed the
product with contaminated water, did not clean the bottles correctly, and
failed to refrigerate after preparation, resulting in the growth of deadly bac-
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Assume that the corporate mission statement states that the pri-
mary purpose of this commercial association is to provide food goods
to consumers in exchange for a fair price, resulting in a reasonable
profit for the owners of the business. Food goods meet authentic
human needs. Their production is a good thing. The terms of the ex-
change between the company and consumer are defined as a "fair
price" which meets the requirements of justice. "Reasonable profits"
as a consequence or goal of an economic enterprise also are just.121
Unlike the Ku Klux Klan, the object of the association itself is morally
permissible, containing no statement of evil purposes.
This hypothetical, then, presents the problem of the legitimate asso-
ciation of persons having a legitimate intention (providing food goods
in exchange for a reasonable price) to pursue a permissible object (the
marketing of its products) in circumstances that render the proposed
action evil. As a general rule, the marketing of baby formula is not
morally problematic. In this case, however, the prospective client
seeks to market powdered baby formula to new mothers in a country
where a majority of the population relies upon untreated water sup-
plies. In the proposed market area, the number one cause of infant
death is dehydration due to diarrhea. This last fact, in combination
with the lack of access to sanitary water supplies, suggests that
mothers should be strongly encouraged to breast feed their chil-
dren.' 22 Under these circumstances the marketing of baby formula
risks creation of artificial needs or desires that would pose a signifi-
cant risk to the health of the infants.l"3 The primary reason the com-
teria. In other cases, the formula was mixed with too much water by
mothers who assumed that more water meant more formula and, conse-
quently, less money spent on baby food. Due to the high level of illiteracy in
developing countries, the women could not read the instruction labels on the
product. If they could, they would have realized that by diluting the formula
they were starving their children.
Caryn L. Finkle, Comment, Nestle, Infant Formula, and Excuses: The Regulation of
Commercial Advertising in Developing Nations, 14 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 602, 603-04
(1994) (citations omitted).
121. Pope John Paul II, The Hundreth Year (Centesimus Annus) para. 35 (1991)
[hereinafter, Pope John Paul II, The Hundreth Year]:
The church acknowledges the legitimate role of profit as an indication that a
business is functioning well.... But profitability is not the only indicator of a
firm's condition. It is possible for the financial accounts to be in order, and
yet for the people-who make up the firm's most valuable asset-to be hu-
miliated and their dignity offended. [This is] morally inadmissible [and] will
eventually have negative repercussions on the firm's economic efficiency....
[T]he purpose of a business firm is [to be] a community of persons... en-
deavoring to satisfy their basic needs . . . at the service of the whole of
society.
Id.
122. Division of Diarrhoeal and Acute Respiratory Disease Control, The Treat-
ment of Diarrhoea § 11.1 (1995) (distributed by the World Health Organization).
123. This problem is of sufficient magnitude that the World Health Organization
and UNICEF developed the International Code of Marketing of Breast Milk
Substitutes.
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pany seeks access to this foreign market is to increase its sales and
profits. This is not an adequate reason to encourage mothers to risk
their children's health through the use of breast milk substitutes.124
Absent additional facts that would either make the risk to these chil-
dren's health moral or eliminate the risk, people directing the actions
of the company would sin by marketing their product in this country.
By accepting representation in this matter, the lawyer also would
sin since advocating access to the market has no purpose other than to
advance the sinful conduct of the client. This formal cooperation
should not be given by the Christian lawyer.
F. Representation of Individuals
Much of this analysis changes when considering the representation
of individuals. The human person shares in the image of God."z This
is the source of the person's innate dignity and the duty of all to re-
spect that dignity. Moral analysis of individual representation must
begin with respect for the dignity of the individual. Yet not all human
actions are worthy of respect. Acts that damage the person's relation-
ship with God are inconsistent with the true good of the person. Such
acts are not due respect by, nor assistance from, others.
The following hypotheticals illustrate the distinction between re-
specting the person and his or her acts:
1. An orthodox Roman Catholic lawyer is asked to defend the ex-
ecutive director of the local Planned Parenthood clinic against
criminal charges for violating federal tax laws regarding the use
of funds from nonprofit entities to promote a political candidate.
Conviction carries a penalty of ten to fifteen years in prison.
2. The same lawyer is asked to defend an abortionist against per-
sonal injury claims based upon his intentional lies to women in
telling them that they were pregnant to induce them to purchase
his abortion services. 126
The requests for representation by these individuals invoke considera-
tion of the Christian requirement to love God and neighbor. Both
cases require defense of past actions, rather than cooperation in the
creation or continuation of opportunities for future wrongdoing. To
create or continue opportunities encouraging others to sin is to com-
mit the sin of scandal and is not a permissible intention or object. In
124. "Of itself, an economic system does not possess criteria for correctly distin-
guishing new and higher forms of satisfying human needs from artificial new needs
which hinder the formation of a mature personality." Pope John Paul 11, The Hun-
dreth Year, supra note 121, at para. 36.
125. "God created man in his image; in the divine image he created him; male and
female he created them." Genesis 1:27; see also Catechism of the Catholic Church,
supra note 24, at §§ 355-57.
126. This hypothetical is adapted from the facts in Holtzman v. Samuel, 495
N.Y.S.2d 583 (Sup. Ct. Kings Cty. 1985).
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contrast, Catholic lawyers are often permitted, and sometimes morally
required, to defend clients who have engaged in past sinful acts.
G. Criminal Prosecutions
In considering the representation of the executive director of the
local affiliate of Planned Parenthood, the Catholic lawyer must re-
spect the human dignity of the prospective client. The director, as a
human person, has intrinsic value and cannot be understood to be pri-
marily or predominantly evil and therefore valueless in the way that
an association or action can. Respect for the person requires the law-
yer to consider the intentions of the director and the object of the
representation. If the intentions of the director are to truthfully vindi-
cate herself from false claims that she violated the positive law and the
object of representation is justice, the Catholic lawyer may embrace
both the intentions and object of the prospective client.
If the director's intentions are to avoid punishment for unjust ac-
tions she knew to violate the law yet willingly took, the lawyer must
consider what actions would be required to achieve the object of the
client-dismissal of the charges or acquittal. Acquittal from criminal
charges is not an intrinsically evil object, even where the defendant
engaged in the criminal conduct charged.2 7 There is no perfect con-
gruence between the positive law and the morality of human conduct.
Illegal and even criminal conduct may be objectively good 2 8 and
127. Consider Christ's defense of the woman caught in adultery. John 8:1-11.
128. Professor David Luban describes the life and death of a lawyer who engaged
in illegal acts to protect innocent human life:
Moltke worked as a lawyer in the international law section of the German
foreign office, spending his wartime career in a never-ending interdepart-
mental battle to prevent depredations against prisoners of war, Jews, and
other victims of Nazism.
To read Moltke's letters to his wife is to witness one of the century's great con-
sciences. It is also to examine the logbook of a familiar lawyer's life: an endless
round of meetings, reports, travel, negotiations, bureaucratic maneuvering, arguments
about technicalities and regulations, long days and late nights, all related in a rather
matter of fact tone .... In the end, Moltke was tried for his anti-Nazi efforts before
the infamous Judge Roland Freisler, perhaps the most horrible and fanatical of Nazi
jurists. He was convicted of treason and executed in January, 1945.
Moltke's final letters, in which he describes his trial and his emotions as he awaited
execution (remarkably, he felt mostly a kind of exaltation) are astonishing docu-
ments. At one point, he writes from the death cell:
In one of his tirades Freisler said to me: "Only in one respect are we and
Christianity alike: we demand the whole mani" I don't know if the others
sitting there took it all in, for it was a sort of dialogue-a spiritual one be-
tween F. and myself, for I could not utter many words-in which we two got
to know each other through and through. Of the whole gang Freisler was
the only one who recognized me, and of the whole gang he is the only one
who knows why he has to kill me .... We talked, as it were, in a vacuum.
He made not a single joke at my expense, as he had done with Delp and
Eugen. No, this was grim earnest: "From whom do you take your orders?
From the Beyond or from Adolf Hitler?" "Who commands your loyalty and
your faith?" All rhetorical questions, of course.-Anyhow, Freisler is the
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legal, or even legally compelled, conduct may be objectively evil.1 29
The Christian must assess each action first on the basis of its conform-
ity with God's law, and, second, on the act's conformity with the posi-
tive law.
In this case, the prospective client may have intentionally violated
the tax laws. In most cases, people are morally required to comply
with the tax law, a duty that arises from our mutual responsibility for
society and our obligation to submit to legitimate authority.",0 The
brief statement of the hypothetical does not reveal any reason to ex-
cuse performance of this duty. Absent unusual circumstances, inten-
tional violation of the tax law would be morally culpable.
This moral culpability does not necessarily translate into an obliga-
tion to willingly suffer the criminal sanction contained in the positive
law absent conformity with the requirements of that law. The direc-
tor, as a member of the political community, has the moral right to
claim the protections the state has promised through its requirements
embodied in the statutes defining the crime and the sanction to be
imposed. By necessity, the positive law is comprised of generaliza-
tions. Many laws approximate the claims of justice in a majority of
circumstances. Yet application of these generalizations in particular
circumstances can be unjust. Recognizing this, legislators and judges
have created or recognized several procedural mechanisms to avoid
first National Socialist who has grasped who I am .... Strangely enough, for
Moltke the trial was a kind of dream come true. It was the moment of truth
in which all technicalities, and indeed all factual charges, were swept away
and the true and ultimate significance of both Nazism and his own life stood
revealed. Everyone, including Freisler, conceded that he had performed no
criminal acts, and thus he was convicted only for respecting God more than
the legal system (i.e., Adolf Hitler).
David Luban, Conscientious Lawyers for Conscientious Lawbreakers, 52 U. Pitt. L
Rev. 793, 798-99 (1991).
129. See Richard Weisberg, The Herineneutic of Acceptance and the Discourse of
the Grotesque, With a Classroom Exercise on Vichy Law, 17 Cardozo L Rev. 1875,
1875 (1996) (using Vichy law to discuss "patterns of legal reasoning of a discourse of
exclusion that rationalized the vicious persecution of some [minority groups] while
maintaining ostensible norms of constitutional decency towards most others"); David
Margolick, The Action of a Lawyer in Occupied France Raises the Question: Is Nit-
Picking Collaboration?, N.Y. Times, May 17, 1991, at B16.
130. "You pay taxes for the same reason, magistrates being God's ministers who
devote themselves to his service with unremitting care. Pay each one his due: taxes
to whom taxes are due; toll to whom toll is due; respect and honor to everyone who
deserves them." Romans 13:5-7; Matthew 22:17-21 illustrates the same point:
"Give us your opinion, then, in this case, is it lawful to pay tax to the em-
peror?" Jesus recognized their bad faith and said to them, "Why are you
trying to trip me up, you hypocrites? Show me the coin used for the tax."
When they handed him a small Roman coin, he asked them, "Whose head is
this, and whose inscription?" "Caesar's," they replied. At that he said to
them, "Then give to Caesar what is Caesar's, but give to God what is God's."
ld.; see also Catechism of the Catholic Church, supra note 24, § 2240 (-Submission to
authority and co-responsibility for the common good make it morally obligatory to
pay taxes.").
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the unjust application of a generally just law. These mechanisms in-
clude prosecutorial discretion, plea bargaining, and jury nullification.
All of these procedures are permissible means to be pursued by the
Christian lawyer for the benefit of the client.
Similarly, all just members of a state desire that the state's power to
punish be used only where justice requires. To this end, certain proce-
dural protections and substantive limitations are created through leg-
islative enactment or judicial interpretation. To ignore these
protections and surreptitiously defy these limitations is to contribute
to the corruption of the state, an act which itself is wrong. The Chris-
tian lawyer's defense of a person charged with a crime promotes the
good of the client and the state by requiring the prosecution to comply
with the letter and the spirit of the law.
It might be argued that morally culpable defendants are called to
confess guilt and accept punishment. This is not true in all circum-
stances. To confess guilt and accept the sanction imposed by state au-
thorities may be a legitimate act of repentance and expiation for
sin,' but it is not the exclusive path to redemption. In the Christian
understanding of the natural order, evasion of man's punishment does
not equate with evasion of justice. 132 The Lord is both the just judge
and the merciful father. The sinner chooses the relationship, and that
choice cannot be coerced. 133
Nowhere are these principles better illustrated than by Christ's re-
sponse to those who would stone the woman caught in adultery.13 4
The scribes and the Pharisees brought the woman before Jesus, and
asked his judgment in light of the Mosaic law that required adulterers
be stoned. 35 After repeated requests for his judgment, Jesus replied,
131. See Catechism of the Catholic Church, supra note 24, § 2266.
132. Cf. Pope John Paul II, The Gospel of Life, para. 9 (1994) (emphasis added):
Not even a murderer loses his personal dignity, and God himself pledges to
guarantee this. And it is precisely here that the paradoxical mystery of the
mercifuljustice of God is shown forth. As Saint Ambrose writes: "Once the
crime is admitted at the very inception of this sinful act of parricide, then the
divine law of God's mercy should be immediately extended. If punishment
is forthwith inflicted on the accused, then men in the exercise of justice
would in no way observe patience and moderation, but would straightaway
condemn the defendant to punishment.... God drove Cain out of his pres-
ence and sent him into exile far away from his native land, so that he passed
from a life of human kindness to one which was more akin to the rude exist-
ence of a wild beast. God, who preferred the correction rather than the
death of a sinner, did not desire that a homicide be punished by the exaction
of another act of homicide."
133. Pope John Paul VI, Declaration of Religious Freedom (Dignitatis Humanae),
para. 2 (1965).
134. John 8:3-11.
135. John 8:3-5. Leviticus 20:10 provides: "If a man commits adultery with his
neighbor's wife, both the adulterer and the adulteress shall be put to death." Deuter-
onomy 22:23-24 states: "[Wlithin the city a man comes upon a maiden who is be-
trothed, and has relations with her, you shall bring them both out to the gate of the
city and there stone them to death."
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"Let the one among you who is without sin be the first to throw a
stone at her.' 1 36 Jesus did not dispute the woman was guilty of the sin
of adultery, nor did he challenge the justice of the Mosaic law. He did
not argue procedural irregularities, which clearly existed, since Scrip-
ture required that both the man and the woman be stoned, and the
accusers had failed to bring the man forward for judgment and punish-
ment. Rather, Jesus required the accusers and potential judges to ex-
amine their fitness to execute so harsh a judgment. They turned away,
leaving only the woman and Jesus, and Jesus sent her away saying,
"Go and sin no more."'137
Christ's example teaches us that Christian lawyers can defend cli-
ents accused of committing crimes. Justice requires that the innocent
have advocates, and human fallibility requires that those we believe to
be guilty be heard in their own defense. The means used to defend
these clients must be moral, however, since it is never permissible to
do evil so that good may come of it.138 The intentional destruction of
the reputation of the truthful witness, presentation of the pejurious
client's testimony-these means are forbidden for Christian
lawyers.1
39
While there is no religious duty to decline all representation of
those accused of crimes, and, in fact, there may be instances when
Christians are obligated to accept such representation, the representa-
tion of the executive director of Planned Parenthood raises concerns
beyond cooperation with evil. The Catholic lawyer may be required
to decline representation in this particular case in order to avoid scan-
dal. The prospective client is accused of using funds to promote a
political candidate. While unstated in the hypothetical, it would be
reasonable to assume her support of the candidate was due, at least in
part, to the director's perception that the candidate was sympathetic
to the goals of Planned Parenthood, an association of persons dedi-
cated to promoting artificial contraception and abortion. 4 ' The in-
tentions and objects of Planned Parenthood as described in its mission
136. John 8:7.
137. John 8:11.
138. Pope John Paul, II, The Splendor of Truth, supra note 28, para. 79-83. On this
point, see Teresa Stanton Collett, Understanding Freedman's Ethics, 33 Ariz. L Rev.
455, 459-60 (1991) (rejecting the presentation of perjurious testimony in the defense
of an accused).
139. These examples are drawn from Professor Freedman's discussion of the duties
of the criminal defense lawyer. Monroe Freedman, Understanding Lawyers' Ethics,
supra note 14, at 109-42, 116-72. My critique of Professor Freedman's position can be
found at Collett, supra note 138, at 455.
140. Planned Parenthood Federation of America's policy and mission statement
states:
All individuals worldwide have the right to nondiscriminatory, confidential
access to the full range of voluntary reproductive health care services that
are proven safe and effective. These services:
(1) should include contraception, sterilization, abortion, fertility enhance-
ment, and prevention and treatment of sexually transmitted diseases;
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statement are contrary to a true understanding of human sexuality 4 ,
and the protection of human life.'4 2 The Church teaching on these
subjects is clear.'43 The Catholic lawyer representing the executive
director against criminal charges related to illegal campaign contribu-
tions may be misunderstood to be advocating the legitimacy of
Planned Parenthood's mission and its attempts to further a distorted
(2) should be offered through efficient, effective, and innovative programs
that preserve individual rights and privacy; and should enable individuals to
have children when and if they are ready physically, emotionally, and
financially.
Consistent with its mission, the Planned Parenthood network of family planning clin-
ics is the single largest provider of abortions in the United States, and a major pro-
vider of artificial contraception. According to the 1995-96 Annual Report of Planned
Parenthood Federation of America, abortion services were provided to 139,899 wo-
men through Planned Parenthood affiliates, with an additional 56,892 women referred
to other abortion providers. "The core of Planned Parenthood reproductive health
services is providing contraception and the health care counseling and services that
accompany it. Nearly 1.9 million women and more than 30,000 men received services
at a Planned Parenthood health care facility in 1995." 1995-96 Annual Report of
Planned Parenthood Federation of America. All affiliates of Planned Parenthood
must share the mission of the national organization; therefore, it is proper to impute
the mission of Planned Parenthood Federation of America to the clinic operated by
the director seeking representation.
141. See Pope John Paul II, On the Family (Familiaris Consortio), para. 36 (1981):
Faced with a culture that largely reduces human sexuality to the level of
something commonplace, since it interprets and lives it in a reductive and
impoverished way by linking it solely with the body and with selfish plea-
sure, the educational service of parents must aim firmly at a training in the
area of sex that is truly and fully personal: for sexuality is an enrichment of
the whole person-body, emotions and soul-and it manifests its inmost
meaning in leading the person to the gift of self in love.
Id. para. 37; see also Sacred Congregation for Catholic Education, Educational Gui-
dance in Human Love: Outlines for Sex Education (1983); Karol Wojtyla (Pope John
Paul II), Love and Responsibility (H.T. Willetts trans. 1981) (looking at sexuality in
the context of 'love' and 'responsibility').
142. "Today this proclamation is especially pressing because of the extraordinary
increase and gravity of threats to the life of individuals and peoples, especially where
life is weak and defenseless. In addition to the ancient scourges of poverty, hunger,
endemic diseases, violence and war, new threats are emerging on an alarmingly vast
scale." Pope John Paul II, The Gospel of Life, supra note 132, para. 3.
143. "Since the first century the Church has affirmed the moral evil of every pro-
cured abortion. This teaching has not changed and remains unchangeable." Cate-
chism of the Catholic Church, supra note 24, § 2271; see also Pope John Paul II, The
Gospel of Life, supra note 132, para. 13; Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the
Faith, Declaration of Procured Abortion (1974). "In contrast [to natural family plan-
ning], 'every action which, whether in anticipation of the conjugal act, or in its accom-
plishment, or in the development of its natural consequences, proposes, whether as an
end or as a means, to render procreation impossible' is intrinsically evil."). Catechism
of the Catholic Church, supra note 24, § 2370; see also Pope Paul VI, On Human Life,
supra note 56, para. 14; Smith, supra note 117, at 141. "Certainly, from the moral
point of view contraception and abortion are specifically different evils: the former
contradicts the full truth of the sexual act as the proper expression of conjugal love,
while the latter destroys the life of a human being; the former is opposed to the virtue
of chastity in marriage, the latter is opposed to the virtue of justice and directly vio-
lates the divine commandment, 'You shall not kill."' Pope John Paul II, The Gospel of
Life, supra note 132, para. 13.
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understanding of human sexuality through political means. This risk
of others misunderstanding the lawyer's actions must be considered in
the context of the lawyer's duty to avoid scandalizing others.
The teachings of St. Paul provide a biblical analogy to a Catholic
lawyer agreeing to defend the executive director of Planned
Parenthood. The early Christians were faced with the question of
whether to eat food that had been sacrificed to idols. There was, and
is, no spiritual significance attached to the physical process of eating
the food. "Now food will not bring us closer to God. We are no worse
off if we do not eat, nor are we better off if we do."" But the act of
eating the food sacrificed to idols might lead other Christians, who
erroneously believe such food to have spiritual significance, into the
sin of acting contrary to their understanding of God's will.'45 This
sinful intention to disregard God's will would convert an innocent act
into a sinful one. To avoid this danger to others, Paul counsels Chris-
tians to abstain from eating the meat, not because the act of eating is
sinful, but because of the potential that eating such food would lead
other believers astray.'4 6
Similarly, where the Catholic lawyer's representation of a particular
defendant is likely to lead others into false beliefs about taking the
lives of unborn children, or the nature of human sexuality, prudence
dictates that the Catholic lawyer decline such representation. Other
lawyers who are not professing Catholics do not risk creating the false
impression that either they reject the teaching of the Church or that
the Church teachings are wrong.
H. Civil Litigation
The second hypothetical poses a different problem for the Christian
lawyer. Civil lawsuits resolve disputes concerning the duties that
members of society owe each other. In the hypothetical case, the
plaintiffs are seeking compensation for the defendant's alleged fraud
in falsely reporting they were pregnant in order to induce them to
purchase abortions. Regardless of whether the allegations concerning
the false reporting of pregnancy tests are true, the prospective client is
engaged in the business of providing abortions. This business involves
the taking of human life without justification. This is an enterprise
that the Christian lawyer cannot further. 14 7
The allegations suggest that the issues to be litigated may not in-
volve the performance of abortions, however. If the plaintiffs were
144. I Corinthians 8:8.
145. I Corinthians 8:10-11.
146. Id.; see also Romans 14:13-23.
147. "In the case of an intrinsically unjust law, such as a law permitting abortion or
euthanasia, it is therefore never licit to obey it or to 'take part in a propaganda cam-
paign in favor of such a law, or vote for it.'" Pope John Paul II, The Gospel of Life,
supra note 132, para. 73.
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not pregnant, as they allege, the surgical procedure did not result in
the taking of human life. If the prospective client knew the plaintiffs
were not pregnant at the time the procedures were performed, he has
lied to them and encouraged them to engage in an objectively evil
act-but he has not aborted their unborn children. Under these cir-
cumstances, can the lawyer defend the prospective client?
If the abortionist disputes the women's claims on the basis that they
were pregnant, and he terminated their pregnancies in accordance
with their agreement, the Catholic lawyer cannot accept the represen-
tation. To do so would implicitly affirm the legal right of the women
and abortionists to agree to end the lives of unborn children. By ac-
cepting representation, the lawyer would accept the duty to argue that
the abortions were "proper," "lawful," or "successful." Yet the teach-
ings of the Church are clear that the state's recognition of a "right" to
abortion is unjust and contrary to natural law and Scripture. 148 In this
case the Catholic lawyer's role in defending the prospective client re-
quires more cooperation with evil than can be justified.
If the prospective client admits the wrongs but opposes the wo-
men's claim for compensation, the lawyer must reject the representa-
tion on the basis that the client seeks an unjust object-denial of
reparation for the wrong done. 1 49
Only if the abortionist admits these wrongs and proposes to settle
the cases by providing full compensation to the women may it be per-
missible for the Catholic lawyer to accept the representation. Yet
even this representation is troublesome because of its potential to mis-
lead the prospective client, opposing parties, and other observers as to
the true nature of abortion.150 The potential to scandalize others by
acceptance of this representation, even when the abortionist seeks to
do justice, is probably sufficient reason to decline the representation.
As a prudential judgment, however, there is room for disagreement
among faithful Catholics.
CONCLUSION
Religious lawyers may never seek evil objects in their pursuit of
clients' objectives. Similarly, they may never engage in representation
with evil intentions, though their objects be morally permissible. In
148. Pope John Paul II, The Gospel of Life, supra note 132, para. 68-74.
149. Catechism of the Catholic Church, supra note 24, § 2487, provides:
Every offense committed against justice and truth entails the duty of repara-
tion, even if its author has been forgiven. When it is impossible publicly to
make reparation for a wrong, it must be made secretly. If someone who has
suffered harm cannot be directly compensated, he must be given moral satis-
faction in the name of charity.
150. "There may be reason to fear, however, that willingness to carry out such ac-
tions will not only cause scandal and weaken the necessary opposition to attacks on
life, but will gradually lead to further capitulation to a mentality of permissiveness."
Pope John Paul II, The Gospel of Life, supra note 132, para. 74.
1380 [Vol. 66
1998] CLIENT SELECTION AND COOPERATION
short, both the intentions and the objects of the lawyer's actions must
be consistent with the believer's relationship with God. In cases
where the lawyer's intentions and objects are permissible, but the cli-
ent seeks legal representation for sinful, but legal, purposes, the law-
yer must carefully consider whether his or her actions have sufficient
purpose other than to facilitate the sinful intention or object. If there
is not sufficient purpose, the lawyer should refuse the representation
since it would require the lawyer to impermissibly cooperate materi-
ally with the sin of the client. In cases where the representation would
require actions that contribute to the sinful intentions or objects of the
client, but have other purposes as well, the lawyer should accept rep-
resentation only where there is sufficiently grave moral reason to do
SO.
The moral analysis presented in this paper seems both complex and
simple. Analytical tools such as the principles of cooperation with
evil, double effect, and the duty to avoid scandal provide some gui-
dance to the Catholic lawyer trying to live an integrated life. Ulti-
mately, however, these principles and their attendant questions boil
down to the question that is currently in vogue among Christian
youth-WWJD-What would Jesus do? Prayer, reflection, and fra-
ternal dialogue provide avenues for God's grace to guide us as we
seek to answer that question in our day-to-day decisions.
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